October 1999

 

 

 Media in Palestine:

 Between the PNA’s Hammer

and the Anvil of Self-Censorship

 

A Human Rights Report

 

 

 

 

 

Written by:             Alia Siksik

 

Researched by:       Maher Farraj

Izzeddin Al-Ruzzi

Alia Siksik

 

Transalted by:        Walid Hadi

 

Edited by:              Gerald Simpson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents

                  

                   A preface

                   An Introduction

                   I.       Written Press:

-         General Background

-         Daily and Weekly newspapers

II.      Censorship, Red lines & Self-Censorship:

a-     Israeli Censorshi

b-     Palestinian Censorship

c-     Tribal Censorship

d-     Advertising Companies Censorship

e-     Self-Censorship

III.      Radio and TV Stations:

a-     Establishment of Private Stations

b-     Horizons of Survival and development    

IV.     Reld Lines & Self-Censorship:

-         Who is responsible?

-         Methods applied in drawing them?

a-     The Israeli Role and the Private Stations

b-     Law is absent

c-     Gaza is also far!

d-     Violations against journalists in precentages

e-     Details of Violations

V.      Incitement:

a-     The Presidential Decree on Incitement

b-     The Trio-Committee to stop Incitement

c-     The Presidential Decree, the special Committee and the freedom of Press

d-     The Presidential Decree, Incitement in the World, and International Standards

VI.   Audio-Visual Stations, By Omar Nazzal

VII.  Tables Showing Violations

 

 

 

 

Special thanks to:

 

Umaya Juha, the cartoonist

 

Abdallah al-Horani, member of the PNA Cabinet

 

Tayseer Masharqa, researcher at Birzeit University

 

Palestinian journalists; those who cooperated with us

 

 

 

Our Funders:

 

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

 

The Government of the Netherlands

 

The Moriah Fund

 

Canada Fund

 

European Foundation

 

Finnish Representative Office at the PNA

 

European Commission (EC)

 

 

 

 

The Photographers:

 

PHRMG Photographers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Director

 

Bassem Eid

 

 

 

Board of Directors

 

Taher al-Nammari, Chairman

 

Mohammad Jadallah, Deputy Chairman

 

Lu’ay Okkeh, General Secretary

 

Rida Abdel-Latif, Treasurer

 

 

 

 

Financial Committee

 

Daoud al-Qunbar

 

Nadwa Sarandah

 

Ismail al-Qudweh

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Preface

by Dr. Tayseer Mashareqa*

 

This report that deals with the freedom of press in Palestine and the violations against it is based on UN principles and articles of the International Declaration of Human Rights, and article 19 in particular.

This report deserves to be evaluated as an organized and effective effort by the team of: Alia Siksik as researcher, with support from Maher Farraj, Izzeddin al-Ruzzi, Walid Hadi and Roula Haddad, who together managed to record the evolving press experiment under the PNA (1994-1999).

This research approaches some of the abuses against the journalism profession in this phase of the Palestinian struggle to obtain their own independent free press. The report also discusses the phenomena of self-censorship among Palestinian journalists after the PA has cancelled the old fashioned sword of censorship.

The historical importance of this report springs out from the fact that it registers an important stage on the road to Palestinian independence from a free journalistic angle, and the freedom of expression in the democratic change.

It would be wrong to take in the contents of this report with excessive sensitivity, because that would harm the subjective value at this time when we need transparency in order to find the path towards our national goals. This report that played the role of the subjective monitor that recorded our faults and mistakes opens our eyes so that we carefully observe and discover our negative practices, so as to evaluate and straighten our march at this time when we are building our democracy.

The report contained basic information that summarized our reality in media, and the size of suffering that journalists face while on duty. It reflects a difficult stage of joy and independence making. All the detailed information, the testimonies, the tables, and the article of Omar Nazzal on the audio-visual stations, all that built up a remarkable picture of our current situation, and drew a map in a serious attempt to up-grade and develop our media performance.

The researcher and the team who prepared this report faced a hard time and technical and linguistic obstacles regarding the testimonies taken from journalists who were abused, and it was hard for them to speak up and tell as they felt the heavy responsibility behind that. It wasn’t easy to record the exact details as those violations occurred in dark rooms behind closed doors. Yet the process of gathering those testimonies and recording them hold in itself the heritage of suffering and struggle of those abused journalists and touches on a socio-political problem that reflects the amount of the pull and push operation that is involved in the media movement at a time when a media system is evolving. And if we are at present putting down the foundations for a state that values democracy, then we should consider the media as a monitoring tool that we have to respect and look after.

It is important, therefore, to appreciate the important role that the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group PHRMG plays in its aspirations for a civil society based on establishments, the rule of laws, democracy and human rights, and the freedom of expression is considered at the top of that.

The report has been reviewed and evaluated by a number of academics and the Ministry of Information, whose response was useful specially Mr. Abdallah al-Horani and Maher al-Masri, Director of press and publications, such responses increase the discussion and highlights the questions addressed in this report. Once again I highly appreciate the work of the researcher Alia Siksik and her colleagues who participated in the preparation of this report that I refer to as a reference to media students, historians and decision-makers because of its value of documentation for an important phase in the life of the Palestinian people.

 

*Dr Tayseer Masharqa is a researcher in Education, Media and Communication at

Birzeit University

 

 

A. Introduction

 

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”            Article 19 from the The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

 

“There shall be no infringement of freedom of expression; within the limits of the law, every human being has the right to express his beliefs and to publish the orally, in writing, by any other means of expression or through art.”                                                 Article 19, The Draft Basic Law of the PNA

 

“The Press and the act of publishing must be free from interference and freedom of expression is guaranteed for every Palestinian; without interference, he may express his belief orally or by any other means, such as photography or art in the means of expression or through the media.”

Article 2, Palestinian Press Law of 1995

 

 

This is not the first time PHRMG has written on the issue of freedom of the Palestinian press, although it is the first time that we have done so since the issuing of the presidential decree on incitement. This decree has restricted the freedom of Palestinians in general and the freedom of the press in particular.

 

We based our research on interviews with journalists who work in private radio and TV stations, in daily newspapers, in foreign news agencies, and with the Press and Publications Officer at the Ministry of Information. Besides, a huge number of written articles, researches on media topics inside and outside Palestine. Furthermore, there were few workshops on the issue, specially the one organized by al-Haq organization in Ramallah

under the title “Legislation of the prevention of incitement, and ambitions to build a democratic system”.

We faced some difficulties while conducting this research such as; the absence of lists of journalists who were abused (such lists were not available at the Journalists Association or the Ministry of Information) so we journalists had to dig their memories to remember details, many of those journalists left this profession for another career, others were afraid to mention the name of the security service that abused them and some asked for some time to consider his testimony.

 

And we wonder: Have violations committed by the Palestinian security organs against Palestinian journalists decreased or increased since the  issuing of the Presidential decree in October 1998?  From the statistics we have been able to compile, we have found that violations committed between 1 January and 30 August 1999 amounted to 6% of the total number of 50 violations that PHRMG has recorded since the coming of the PA in 1994. This % is to be considered low: the percentages for 1996, 1997 and 1998 stood at 30%, 20% and 24% respectively.  This low percentage in 1999 does not, however, indicate a decrease in the red lines drawn by the Authority. Instead, PHRMG has established that there has been an increase in self-censorship by journalists who have been anticipating the Authority’s violations.

 

Two thirds of the violations committed against Palestinian journalists took place in Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the number of journalists and the amount of printed material is larger in the West Bank. There are three possible factors explaining these statistics. Firstly, there are no private television and radio stations in Gaza, whereas such stations number 35 in the West Bank. Secondly, the comparatively higher population density of Gaza is a social reality which renders the control of the masses all the more difficult in case the population is encouraged to protest against the Authority on the basis of distributed information. Finally, it may be that the Authority simply has more control over the Gaza Strip than over the West Bank.

 

In the light of what the PHRMG has recorded, we have established that most of these violations in the Autonomous Areas have been committed by the Palestinian Security Services. The Ministry of Information has hindered the distribution of newspapers and has closed television stations.

 

In section one of the research, we looked at the written press, giving a general background to the daily newspapers prior to 1967, and after that, through the different phases till the coming of the PNA, and then to 1999.

In the second section, under the title “Red lines and self-censorship” we classified the sorts of censorship that face the Palestinian journalist, discussing each of them separately trying to be comprehensive in our approach, thus giving focus on the self-censorship because of its negative effect in limiting the freedom of thinking and writing. In the third section, entitled “The Private radio and TV stations” we indicated how those stations came into existence and developed, and the role of the Ministry of Information in that, and the Israeli and Palestinian violations against them. In section four, entitled “Violations against the Palestinian journalists” we concluded a group of percentages that provide us with a picture in the form of figures on the nature of these violations and the methods adopted in them, and the security services that carry them out. These violations are distributed on the years as they occurred, then we showed the 49 violations in the form of a table as recorded by the PHRMG. The last, fifth, section entitled “Incitement” deals with this issue comprehensively. It starts by mentioning few articles from the “Wye River Memorandum” on the subject, then the Presidential decree forbidding incitement and its legality and whether this decree agrees with international standards for human rights, and its influence on the press, and the Trio Committee (Palestinian – American – Israeli) to prevent incitement which was formed after the Wye agreement.

 

PHRMG stresses the seriousness of the phenomenon of increasing self-censorship among Palestinian journalists, which not only prevents the publishing of written material and limits freedom of thought, but also hinders the development of our people at the beginning of the 21^st century. Instead, the Palestinian Authority should consecrate our freedoms so as to emanate what other nations of the modern world have achieved so far and should prevent Palestine from being comparable to underdeveloped and undemocratic states, because our people deserve to have the freedom to think. After the many years of suppression and subjugation, our people deserve to have their freedom to think protected.

 

 

B. Written Press

 

1. General Background

 

Prior to the 1967 Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian lands of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the Palestinian press in Gaza was under Egyptian administration, whilst the press in the West Bank fell under Jordanian auspices. Three newspapers were published in Jerusalem: “Falastin”, “Al-Difa’a” (defense) and “Al-Jihad” (holy war). After the Israeli occupation in 1967, most of the Palestinian newspapers focused on the local situation and ended their affiliation with the Egyptian and Jordanian press. “Al-Quds” (Jerusalem) newspaper appeared at that time after both Al-Difa’a and Al-Jihad had merged. Other newspapers appeared every now and then but the occupying power used to close them because these papers crossed the red lines drawn for them.

 

In addition to their own military orders, the occupying power made use of the British Emergency Regulations of 1945 in order to justify control over Palestinian newspapers. The Palestinian Authority ensured that these orders remained in force, flexible and unclear so as to avoid conferring any freedom of maneuver concerning the exercise of freedom of opinion.

 

Article 88 of those military orders provides that “it is permitted to prevent the publication and distribution of any book or newspaper or other printed material if the censor considers the material to amount to incitement to violence and aggression; it is also forbidden to publish books that harm state security and public order in the state of Israel or in the area under Israeli military administration”.

 

All newspapers used to be sent to the military censor which would delete material classified as “incitement” or as potentially “harm[ing] the security of the Israeli state”. Newspapers published in Jerusalem are still subject to such censorship. Military censorship would also prevent the use of vocabulary or expressions relating to Palestinians’ feelings or identity.

 

Palestinian newspapers sometimes succeeded in publishing articles taken from the Hebrew press (which had been untouched by the censor) on  Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories.

 

The Occupying Power used to confront journalists who did not commit themselves to the rigour of the censor’s red line: these were either arrested or deported, put under house arrest or prevented from travelling, beaten or even shot at with live ammunition. Detention of Palestinian journalists between January 1987 and August 1991 reached a total of 205. Newspapers and press offices failing to obey regulations were closed down. (Figures taken from “Palestinian Press under the Autonomous Authority” Qadaya Al-Umma Magazine, September 1997)

 

After the coming of the Palestinian Authority those areas not transferred to its rule remained subject to the same Israeli regulations, whereas areas under the Palestinian Autonomous Authority would face the Palestinian censor  that generally acts after articles have been published. The punishment for those crossing the red lined varies from beatings to insults, from arrest to the confiscation of films or the closing down of press offices or newspapers. The ambit of these red lines is not written anywhere but every journalist knows their limits all too well. We shall return to them later in the report.

 

 

 

2. Daily Newspapers

 

Some newspapers were established before the coming of the PA. Some were daily, such as “Al-Quds” (Jerusalem),  “Al-Nahar” (Day-time), “Al-Sha’ab” (the People) and “Al-Fajr” (the Dawn), whilst others were weekly, such as “Al-Mithaq” (the Covenant) and “Al-Talee’ah” (the Forefront). Others opened and then closed principally for financial reasons. After the coming of the PA, three new daily newspapers appeared: “Al-Ayyam” (the Days), “Al-Hayat Al-Jadida” (the New Life), and “Al-Bilad” (the Country).

 

Other weekly or bi-weekly newspapers also appeared, almost all of which belong to the political opposition. These include: “Al-Watan” (the Homeland) and “Al-Risala” (the Message) which belong to “Al-Khalas Al-Watani Al-Islami” (The National Islamic Salvation Party); “Al-Istiqlal” (the Independence) which belongs to the Islamic Jihad; and “Al-Masar” (the Path) which is a bi-weekly and belongs to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. “Al-Watan” was closed by the PA, but the other three are still working until present. What is obvious about these newspapers is that their political line widens according to the political position of the party they belong to.

 

Turning to the major newspapers:

 

Al-Quds (Jerusalem)

 

Al-Quds is the most widely distributed newspaper, read by 61.3% of the readers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (according to a poll organized by Jerusalem Media & Communications Center (JMCC) in August 1998). It was established in 1951 and was published under the name “Al-Jihad” until 1967 which is when it was joined by “Al-Difa’a” to give it its present name “Al-Quds”. Its owner and publisher is Mahmoud Abu-Zalaf. Its chief editor is his son, Waleed Abu-Zalaf.

 

Prior to the Intifada (uprising), the newspaper followed the line of Jordan, but after the Intifada there was an agreement between the administration of the newspaper and the PLO that the newspaper would follow only a Palestinian line and that the PLO would, in turn, support it financially.

 

After the coming of the PA, the placement of the censor’s red lines was no longer so clear: a dispute between the PA and al-Quds over the number of people attending one of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) rallies occurred and resulted in General Ghazi al-Jabali, head of the Palestinian Police, blocking the distribution of al-Quds in the Gaza Strip for four days. Following this occurrence, a close relationship was forged between the administrative editor of al-Quds and Colonel Jibreel al-Rujoub, Head of the Preventive Security in the West Bank, which resulted in daily contact between the two parties with a view to agreeing firstly on what should appear on the front page of each edition and secondly on the content of articles criticising the Authority or one of its institutions.

 

 

For the PA’s strategy to be executed perfectly and to avoid journalists wasting time, they are given instructions on how to write and edit articles and reports that are void of any critical analysis by the journalist himself. If a piece of news is deemed to be vital but criticizes the authority, it is published in an inconspicuous place within the paper and with a small heading. Thus the story in effect loses its importance. Moreover, when a piece mentions that a security organ has abused a citizen, the newspaper inevitably fails to give details of the name or age of the victim and fails to mention which security department has been responsible. If the matter involves criticism of high officials in the Authority, al-Quds does not publish anything on the matter until it has been dealt with by other papers. A journalist who works for al-Quds is on record as having said that “before publishing the report on corruption within the PA, I had to submit a draft copy of it: the newspaper did not publish it immediately. If it had done so, this would have constituted a precedent. After this episode, I stayed at home for a week not doing anything”.

 

At times the newspaper is asked to delay publication of a report dealing with an error committed by the PA until the latter straightens things out. After this has been done, the newspaper publishes a report both on the error as well as on its rectification. On other occasions a journalist from the paper is asked to conduct an interview with someone who is on good terms with the owner of the paper whilst the paper refuses to publish anything on individuals that are on bad terms with the owner.

 

 

Al-Ayyam (the Days)

 

This is the second most widely distributed newspaper, read by 19.2% of Palestinian readers (according to the 1998 JMCC poll). It was established in 1995 with a total capital of five million Jordanian Dinar. The first issue appeared on the 12 December 1995. Its chief editor is Akram Haniyeh, who is also the media advisor of President Arafat. Its readiness to challenge some of the red lines drawn by the Authority is to be explained by its chief editor’s close relations with President Arafat: this permits the newspaper to tackle more sensitive issues and - at times - to be critical of the PA.

 

Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (the New Life)

 

This is the third largest paper, read by 13.7% of readers (according to the 1998 JMCC poll). It was established in 1995 and adopted a pro PA line from the beginning. Its General Director is Nabeel Amro, an advisor to President Arafat. Its chief editor is Hafez Barghouti.

 

Most of the papers employees receive their salaries from the Ministry of Finance, which means that they are state employees. A decision was taken in December 1997 to transfer all 18 of the newspaper’s employees to the Public Employees Department of the PA. General Intelligence in Gaza, however, reversed this decision for the following employees:

 

-    Hasan Douhan, aged 24, employed by the newspaper for 3 years;

-         Mustafa Sheikh Eid, aged 29, employed by the computer department of the newspaper for 4 years;

-         Sameer Hamtou, aged 30, employed by the newspaper for 4 years.

 

These journalists receive separate salaries, paid directly by the newspaper, and have neither employment contracts nor any kind of insurance benefit. The reason may well be that these three workers are affiliated to the Islamic block.

 

Al-Nahar (the Day-time)

This newspaper appeared in March 1986. Its publisher was Othman Al-Hallaq and its chief editor Issam Al-Anani. The paper closed on 1 January 1997 and was known for following the Jordanian line.

 

Its closure was caused by financial problems precipitated by PA pressure on the paper. At one point in 1994 it was closed for 40 days which resulted in the loss of both sponsors and readers who discontinued their support and turned to other newspapers. Some individuals also advised newsagents to not to display al-Nahar in conspicuous positions on their newsstands.

 

Al-Bilad (the Country)

 

Al-Bilad independent newspaper was published for the first time on a daily basis on 13 May 1995 by the Palestinian House for Art and Media Production. By the beginning of 1997 it had turned into a weekly because of financial problems and finally closed on 10 August 1998. Its publisher was As’ad Al-As’ad and its director Hani Arafat.

 

Al-Bilad did not receive any external financial support. In May of 1995 it boasted 60 journalists, which dwindled to 15 when it became a weekly in 1997. At its peak it distributed around 5000 copies.

 

Al-As’ad explained the line of his newspaper: “We want to have a paper which reflects both sides of the coin and which provides the reader with things that he won’t find on satellites!” He was summoned to the office of Jibreel al-Rujoub on 6 February 1996 and was questioned for 14 hours about why he had criticized President Arafat. “After this incident”, Al’As’ad says “I imposed self-censorship because I knew the contrary would upset the Authority”.

 

Its worth mentioning that the reason why al-As’ad was summoned on orders received from the President’s Office, was that he had published a report on President Arafat’s economics advisor, Khaled Salam, and on Salam’s secret contacts with Yosi Gunar, the ex-chairman of the “Shabak” (the Israeli intelligence service). 

 

Al-Watan (the Homeland)

 

This newspaper, affiliated to Hamas, was established on 28 April 1995 and closed down on 25 December 1995. Between those two dates it was closed down twice by the Palestinian security forces.

The first of these two closures took place in May 1995 for a period of two months and a half and was justified on the basis of a report that had been taken from the BBC which had reported that the name “Zahwa”, the name of President Arafat’s daughter, would appear in a commercial advertisement. The newspaper’s administration was not informed of this reason, though the President’s General Secretary, Tayeb Abdel-Rahim, mentioned this fact when he latter spoke with the newspaper’s officials.

 

The second of the closures took place on 5 August 1995 for a period of one month and was caused by the publication of an article that had criticized President Arafat.

 

On both occasions, the administration of the newspaper only became aware of the orders for closure on the morning of the actual closure: no warning was given. According to the chief editor of the newspaper Dr. Ghazi Hamad, “we would find a paper stamped by the police ordering the closure of the newspaper until further notice”. The newspaper was reopened twice after “mediators” intervened. The official channel - direct contact between the paper and the Attorney General or the Ministry of Information – was not used.

 

Al-Risala (the Message)

 

This is a weekly newspaper published by the National Islamic Salvation Party. It is headed by Ghazi Hamad,  first appeared on 1 January 1997 and was closed for the first time by the Palestinian police on 4 September 1997 for a period of three months on the grounds that an article written by Abdel-Sattar Qassem on Egyptian financial support to the PA had defamed President Mubarak. This article criticised the misuse of such funds to pay for congratulatory advertisements.

 

Members of the police and preventive security raided the premises of the newspaper, confiscated some materials and placed an order on the outside door prohibiting entry. This was accomplished without the knowledge of the Attorney General. The newspaper’s administration took the case to the High Court who ordered the reopening of the newspaper’s offices on 15 May 1998. In the event but the offices reopened on 4 December 1997, that is to say before the decision of the High Court.

 

On 27 April 1999 Dr. Hamad was summoned to police headquarters and was told that his newspaper would be closed until further notice. When he asked for reasons, Major Mahmoud Saqr replied: “I don’t know”. The Head of the Journalists Association in Gaza, Tawfiq Abu-khousa, intervened by contacting Tayeb Abdel-Rahim, General Secretary of the President. Dr. Hamad reports that, “Tawfiq Abu-Khousa and Major Mahmoud Saqr came to the offices of the newspaper and said that Tayeb Abdel-Rahim had decided to reopen the newspaper”. When Hamad again asked about the reasons for the closure, they pleaded ignorance.

 

And on 22 May 1999 Ghazi Hamad was summoned again, this time to criminal intelligence at police headquarters. He was asked about the report on Ayman al-Amssi who had been tortured by Palestinian police after being charged with the rape of a woman from inside the green line despite the fact that he had been pronounced innocent of the charge by an Israeli court and had been released. Dr. Hamad was kept until the following day. The chief editor, Salah Bardawil, and writer of the report, Wisam Afifiyeh, were detained for two days and were released following the intervention of the Journalists Association.

 

 

Al-Istiqlal (the Independence)

 

A political weekly affiliated with Islamic Jihad, this paper first appeared on 21 October 1994.

 

In February 1995 several members of the security forces raided the offices of the newspaper, confiscated material and arrested six employees for periods ranging from 23 days to 3 months. The newspaper was closed with sealing wax. “The next day”, says the chief editor Ala’a Saftawi, “they took me out of prison and back to the office where I saw the ex- Attorney General Khaled al-Qidra and the Mukhtar of the neighborhood. They took out 5000 shekels from one of my drawers (received from subscriptions and advertisements in the paper) and asked me from where I had received the money. Following a meeting with President Arafat,  they allowed us to reopen one and a half months later”. The administration of the newspaper was not informed about the reason for that closure, but the closure coincided with suicide bombings committed by the Islamic Jihad, in which one of the paper’s employees, the director Hani Abed, was killed.

 

The second closure clearly took place for political reasons. Tayeb Abdel-Rahim summoned Saftawi to his office on 10 July 1998 and informed him that the Authority had to close the newspaper because the political atmosphere could not allow it to continue and that this was the decision of the political leadership. Saftawi said: “They didn’t hand me a written order but I recognised that there was Israeli pressure demanding seven items. The 4^th was the closure of the centre for incitement, Al-Istiqlal newspaper”.

 

Saftawi was summoned several times by the police concerning articles that the paper published. The first time was for few hours in mid February 1996 relating to a report on the killing of Ayman al-Raznieh and Imad al-A’raj in al-Shati (Beach) camp.

 

The second time was on 27 February 1996 when a (unidentified) police force took Saftawi from his house after midnight to police headquarters, where he was interrogated concerning the front page article published on 16 February 1996 under the title “oath and responsibility” which had the police claimed personally criticized President Arafat. Saftawi states that the police said: “How dare you speak like that about the President? In all the history of Arab democracies no one insulted a President!” Saftawi states that he responded in the following manner: “I didn’t mean to insult President Arafat because I respect his long past struggle. All I wanted to do was draw attention to the deteriorating security situation”. The police detained him for three days.

 

 

C. Censorship, Red Lines and Self-Censorship

A journalist in Palestine faces both external censorship, which restricts his freedom of opinion and expression, and the consequences of self-censorship, which limit his initiative to reflect on issues he believes may exceed the limits of the red lines. This fact makes the local press behave like parrots, repeating without questions or criticism that which is expected of them. We may exclude the “Al-Hayat Al-Jadida” newspaper which was established in June 1999 and publishes reports and essays criticizing officials in certain institutions. The Authority considers this to be slander rather than constructive criticism.

 

We have categorized censorship measures that journalists face on a daily basis under the following:

 

1. Israeli censorship

2. Palestinian censorship

3. Tribal censorship (customs and traditions)

4. Advertising companies’ censorship

5. Self-censorship

 

 

1. Israeli Censorship

 

During the premierships of Rabin and Peres, Israeli censorship was formal: the censor only censored reports on the Israeli Intelligence Service and some reports on the Palestinian opposition. But when Netanhyahu took over, the censor began to delete reports on both the Authority as well as the opposition. Israeli radio also submitted to the views of the censor. An example of the latter is when in July 1999 the “Shin Bet” (Israeli Intelligence Service) summoned the Chief Secretary and the Editor-in-Chief of al-Quds newspaper to discuss a report al-Quds had published one and a half years previously concerning an attack carried out by Hamas. That particular report had been taken from Israeli radio.

(Taken from an interview with a journalist who asked that his name be withheld)

 

News and reports that have to go to the censor include those covering the following subjects: settlements, the status of Jerusalem, borders and announcements potentially fuelling nationalist sentiments, any information pertaining to Israeli military forces (such as the identity of officers’ who have abused citizens) and the names of those whose houses have been demolished. Linguistic censorship includes removal of terms such as  “martyr”.

 

 

2. Palestinian Censorship

 

The red lines which the PA has drawn for journalists cover such varied subjects as writing about the President and his family in a critical manner through writing about security organs or the security situation and the presentation of ideas proposed by the opposition to speaking about Hamas leaders wanted by the Authority. The following are only some of the examples.

 

The PA arrested the journalist Ala’a Saftawi on the basis of a leading article he had written for al-Istiqlal newspaper about the deteriorating security situation. It was held to be too critical of the President.

 

Dr. Ghazi Hamad was arrested and tortured for ten days on the basis of an essay he had written for al-Istiqlal newspaper on the relationship between the Palestinian people and the security services.

 

Journalist Taher Shreiteh, a Reuters correspondent, was arrested for six days because he released a film that showed the Israeli soldier Nahshon Vaxman, kidnapped by Hamas.

 

On 14 May 1996 the journalist Fayez Ibrahim Noureddin was arrested because he had published a photo in al-Ayyam newspaper showing men pushing a donkey into the sea. Underneath he had written “Donkeys’ Speciality”.

For further information see the section on “Abusing Journalists Rights”

 

 

3. Tribal Censorship

 

Tribe mentality and the “logic” of physical force still dominates on many issues within Palestinian society. This is at least t be partly explained by the weakness of the Palestinian judicial system. Because journalists are part of this community, they are limited by this approach and false logic. Consequently, PHRMG would underline that the press does not comment on

tribal disputes and fails to criticize questionable traditions.

 

 

Some serious phenomena in Palestinian society require study and analysis, but journalists fear to do so because they are afraid of being harmed at their place of work. There are, for example, cases of gunfire and murder occurring in the community that need to be looked into in some detail, and yet on certain occasions such cases of murder are not reported at all. A journalist writing about such incidents risks being harmed. To take but one example, two years ago a journalist wrote, in a periodical, about a wedding in which the bride sat on a chair placed next to another chair on which the photo of the bridegroom had be placed. He was in America. The journalist in question did not mention names or places, and yet the family of the bride came to the offices of the periodical and threatened its administration.

                     PHRMG interview with journalist Majed Arouri

 

4. Advertising Companies’ Censorship

Big advertising companies who regularly have their commercial advertisements published exert great influence: with a view to retaining their sources of funding, newspapers refuse to publish any material that may harm the interest of these companies, such as articles on the negative effects of smoking.

 

 

 

5. Self-Censorship

 

Self-censorship is considered more serious than external censorship because it not only prevents the journalist from publishing that which he as written, but also from writing, thinking or analyzing in the first place. He clearly wishes to avoid wasting time on writing material that may not be published.

 

Forms of self-censorship:

-         The failure of our own press to report on the news and reports that we read about in the foreign press, such as on the weakness in the performance of our leadership, on corruption or analysis of political reports and other issues.

-         The focus on the Authority’s reaction to an action, rather than on the action itself. Usually the latter is of more importance. An example is that when a prisoner dies in jail, no details are given about the prisoner himself or about the reason for his death: the only reporting done is on the reaction of Authority’s officials.

-         The avoidance of giving the name of the security service that has committed a violation: all that is mentioned is “the security services”. The papers fear that if they give the precise reference, they will be pursued by officials of that service.

-         The failure of some newspapers to report on the interference committed by a security organ against employees of those papers.

 

Self-censorship also occurs when journalists hear of colleagues from other papers being abused by the security services on the basis of having crossed the red lines: the former desist from criticism as a result of fear of undergoing the same experience or as a result of remembering their own personal experience of similar treatment.

 

Before officially publishing the report on corruption, the newspaper refused to publish it. If it had agreed to publication, this would have been a precedent. I now impose self-censorship and consequently do not write anything concerning the performance of the Authority or the Authority’s political prisoners.     A journalist who refused to have his name printed.

 

All the above concerns what is called the red line which no one working in the media may cross. There is, unfortunately, no set of clear and precise ethics provided for by Palestinian law that defines the limits to what the media may say. Spontaneously imposing self-censorship on the written and spoken word as well as on intentions to write or speak out is therefore inevitable. It means taking the initiative when writing about a subject that has a direct or indirect relation with the Palestinian security organs or when criticizing a public personality for the performance of the Authority or of one of its departments. Tackling such issues or even thinking about them makes the journalist worry, reluctant, afraid and nervous: should he write about the matter directly or indirectly? Should he give the subject full or partial coverage? Or should he ignore the whole issue and write about something comparatively less important in the life of the Palestinian people?

 

 

D.  Private Radio and TV Stations

 

1.     General Background

Prior to the coming of the PA there were some private TV stations in the north of the West Bank. This was to be explained by the fact that this area is close to the Arab towns in the Galilee (inside the green line) where there are many TV cables. These stations broadcast entertainment programs taken mainly from satellites and received permits from the Occupying Power at a time when journalists were arrested and newspapers were being closed down. The reason for this support may well have been that the stations in question only transmitted entertainment programs: nothing constructive to enlighten Palestinian society on political issues was emitted.

 

2.     The coming of the PA

 

After the coming of the PA, the number of private TV stations increased rapidly. At the time of writing this report, 27 TV and 8 radio stations have been established.  Most of them are located in the north of the West Bank (17 TV and 4 radio), a fact to be explained by the infrastructure that was already in place before the coming of the PA.

 

There are 27 TV private stations and 8 private Radio stations, distributed as follows: 9 TVs in Nablus, 4 in Ramallah, 4 in Tulkarem, 3 in Hebron, 2 in Qalqilia and 2 in Jenin. In clear geographical terms, this means 17 in the north of the West Bank, 4 in the center and 6 in the south.

 

3.     Constraints on the stations

These stations vary in their technical capacity, in the principles they profess, in the messages they emit and in the goals they seek to achieve. They also vary with regard to the extent to which they are subjected to external censorship and in the extent to which they practice self-censorship. Many of these stations face further internal and external problems.

 

Concerning external factors, there is no law – which, amongst other things, should seek to prevent more than one authority from having supervisory status over the station - to govern the functioning of these stations. It may be inevitable that no such law can be drafted before an agreement is reached between the Authority and Israel as to the waves and frequencies to be used. Because of its flexibility, the law on incitement to violence is another obstacle which significantly limits these stations’ flexibility.

As for the internal problems that face these stations: the Ministry, and despite the conditions that it put forward, didn’t maintain the minimum technical and professional standard, which means that the viewer may suffer cut in the transmission several times in one day, or a program taken from an Arab station with the attempt to cover the logo of that station, or an inexperienced presenter looking to the right and left every now and then while he is live on the air, and other disturbing matters.

 

4. What are the reasons for having these stations? And who is responsible for them?

 

Before the coming of the PA, the Palestinian people had been hoping to have Palestinian radio and television engaging in research, in discourse on Palestinian issues and that expresses the ideas and thoughts of the Palestinian community. In our people’s mind, this was to be a significant step after their dependence on the Jordanian media (in the West Bank), on the Egyptian media (in Gaza) and on the Israeli media (in both areas) before the coming of the PA.

 

After the coming of the Authority, official Palestine television and radio started transmitting. Palestinians felt proud as a part of their freedom had been realized. This positive feeling didn’t last long, as people recognized that official television and radio only presents and reflects one point of view: the official point of view. All other ideas and thoughts that opposed the Authority were neglected. Palestinian society needed stations that reflected its emotions and worries and so some private television stations and radios were established.

 

The reason we established “Watan” television in April 1996 was that our people had lived for 30 years without having its own Palestinian media. Palestinian TV and radio are officially dictated to and we therefore need a more balanced and democratic media that allows for pluralism in the presentation of ideas. This stage represents the phase of building the nation Omar Nazzal, Director General of Watan TV

 

The Minister of Information, Yasser Abed Rabbo, confirmed that the PA retains the exclusive right to establish religious tv and radio stations. According to the rules of the Press Law, no one has the right to establish such stations without the agreement of the Authority until a new “law for audio-visual media” has been established.

                                                          Al-Quds newspaper on 21.4.1999

 

In some areas there was actually a need for such stations. Bethlehem is one example where the people needed  radio station to meet their needs as they approach the year 2000, confirmed Ahmad Hammad the Executive Director of Bethlehem 2000 Radio. As for the founders and directors of these stations, “most of them are either independent or from the opposition” said Hani Al-Masri from the Ministry of Information:  Al-Quds newspaper (22.2.1999). Some of them are professional who have a message and want to pass it to the people, whilst others don’t even have a minimum of experience in this field. Director of the Publication Department at the Ministry of Information, Maher al-Masri, says: “Most of the owners and workers in these stations came from other professions and have very limited experience”.

 

5.  Does the Ministry of Information strive to maintain a minimum standard within these stations? What is the scope of their role and development?

 

The Ministry of Information has given temporary annual permits for 35 stations. Hani al-Masri has explained this willingness through reference to various criteria such as the commitment to fostering pluralism in ideas and thoughts in politics and the arts, the encouragement of competition which guarantees the best services for the citizen and the desire to recapture the  Palestinian share of Palestinian air waves.

 

But the question remains: does Palestinian society need so many stations? And are the pre-conditions for permits imposed by the Ministry of Information sufficient to guarantee successful technical running of these stations? Or are other measures needed?

 

The television viewer may initially watch three or four stations for some time but will eventually prefer the one that most satisfies his needs. The geographical sphere of transmission of these stations will expand in the future to reach most of the Occupied Territories, thus giving the viewer the chance to see an even larger number of stations. Eventually, stations that are generally preferred will continue and will develop, whilst others will close. In this atmosphere of competition, specialization will be achieved in the work of these stations. Though such specialization is currently absent, experience in the West shows that specialization has been very successful. Stations may specialize in sport,  economics,  news, childrens programmes, religion and so on. By achieving this specialization, the viewer will have more satisfaction of his needs and a clearer expression of his thoughts and beliefs. This could also create a place for the media outlets of political parties, as happened for years in Lebanon.

Look at the article by Omar                 Nazzal on Audio-Visual Stations.

 

6. Conditions for obtaining a permit:

 

(i)                Having a certain number of professional and experienced workers

(ii)              Having a studio with equipment that does not harm either health or the environment

(iii)            Running equipment that does not interfere with other stations

(iv)            Local programmes must not cover less than 25% of the transmission time

(v)              A radio station must have a minimum of US$ 60,000 as starting capital, whereas a TV station should have a minimum of US$ 140,000.

(vi)            Possession of good conduct certificates by the Head of the station and by the Director

(vii)          Agreement from the Ministry of Transport on technical aspects and the frequency.

(As explained by Hani al-Masri, Director of the Press Department)

 

Despite the conditions imposed by the Ministry, it failed to maintain the minimum technical standards. Viewers may suffer cuts in transmission several times a day or may watch a program already transmitted by another Arab station with an attempt to hide the logo of that first station. An inexperienced presenter live on air looks to the left, then to the right to receive guidelines.

 

 

7.       Red lines and self-censorship: Who is responsible? What are the methods followed in drawing them?

 

Red lines drawn by private stations include failing to criticise the Authority, failing to meet with Hamas leaders wanted by the Authority, failing to transmit scenes showing the burning of the American and Israeli flags and failing to cover the workers’ strikes. The drawing of these lines may take place before the transmission and pursuant to a communication made between officials in the Authority and the administration of the station, expressing their objection to the screening of a certain event or the discussion of a subject in a certain way.

 

The person who may make the contact by telephone or by coming personally to the station is normally a police spokesman, the preventive security or any other member of the security service’s personnel. These normally follow orders from higher officials. On some amusing occasions such personnel has come to a station to hand down the order whilst being on air: some ensuing discussions have consequently been transmitted live to viewers.

 

If a problem has occurred one day before the program, they (the security, especially the police) will call the station in anticipation of coverage the following day. The station is asked not to mention anything on the specific problem. Examples of such issues include the dispute between members of the police and some citizens from Beit-Sahour, the case when a woman was killed in the name of her father’s honor and the dispute between the Mayor and some members within the municipality.Said Ahmad Hammad, director of Bethlehem 2000 radio

 

Al-Amal TV in Hebron discontinued its transmission during a weekly live program entitled “the bond must be broken” (which deals specifically with the issue off Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons) because a woman called and asked that detainees inside Palestinian prisons also be discussed. This cut in the transmission was due to the fact that the administration of the station feared that it risked being closed down by the security services following the call.                                                  

al-Risala weekly newspaper, 5.11.98

 

Director and founder of Watan TV, Omar Nazzal, confirms that the security services have interfered in tv transmission in the past and that they continue to do so. He mentions an incident that occurred prior to the closure of the station: “This was before the third closure in September 1996, when a police officer told me whilst I was live on air that the decision to close down the station had been taken. All the viewers heard the conversation. At that same moment, the Director of the Police called me and started to curse the officer live on the air. These incidents occurred during the tunnel constructions [in Jerusalem]”. The station reopened - after a closure that had lasted three days - on the condition that no political communiqué be transmitted without the approval of a person from the “political and moral guidance” office who had to see and approve everything prior to transmission. In another incident, Sa’eb Nassar from the political and moral guidance office came and informed me (says Nazzal) not to transmit or cover anything concerning the PFLP’s anniversary.       The PFLP anniversary is on the 11^th of December

 

The decision to close down the station was taken by the Higher Security Council, which includes all the officials of the security services as well as  the governor whom I asked to see the same night. The Minister Jameel al-Tarifi stated that “Israel demanded that we shut down Palestine TV and Watan TV: as to the former we have no problem, but for the later, Watan TV,…                                        Omar Nazzal told the PHRMG

 

Other measures taken against Watan TV:

 

-         The governor called and asked that no news concerning the teacher’s strike be mentioned. The strike ended at almost the same time so no confrontation occurred.

 

-         At the time when Mohey-eddin al-Sharif was assassinated, the security services called and asked that we “lower the tune” because we were transmitting some nationalistic songs.

 

-         During the Iraqi crisis, during February – March 1998, the Ministry of Information asked us not to transmit films showing the burning of American and Israeli flags. Nor were we to transmit any declarations from Palestinian officials. We were only to cover things as they happened in Iraq!

 

The Ministry of Interior closed al-Rua’a (Shepherds) TV in Bethlehem on 17 May 1999 after they screened the script play “Natreen Faraj”. The Director of the station, Hamdi Farraj, received the order for closure, issued by the Head of the Preventive Security Service in the West Bank, which read: “Following the President’s instructions, al-Rua’a TV which transmits from Bethlehem, will be closed on the grounds that it has surpassed the limits of local TV stations…”     

                                                     (See the order for closure attached)

 

George Hazboun, Director General of the Ministry of Interior for Social Relations in  the Bethlehem District, said that the Ministry is aware of the attempts that are made to stir up disputes between different religions and sects and explained that the closure of Al-Rua’a (Shepherds) TV came after employees of the Ministry had watched a recording of the play “Natreen Faraj” which ostensibly criticised Jesus Christ. On the other hand, Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior Zakaria Abdel-Rahim maintains that the Ministry has nothing to do with the closure of Shepherds TV. Representatives from various religious groups and churches and institutions from the Bethlehem area wrote to President Arafat requesting him to reopen the station, stressing that they had not demanded its closure. They also expressed their disagreement with the Authority’s explanation that Christians in the area requested the closure.

 

 

On the 16 & 17 February 1998, eight television stations were closed by the Ministry of Information on the grounds that they had violated some of the rules and orders related to their work. The Head of Police, General Ghazi Al-Jabali, has issued an order to all police directorates ordering that all proprietors of television stations should sign a commitment confirming that “they would respect the national interest and that there should be no reporting on rallies, demonstrations or on any news that might affect stability and that there should be no screening of flag-burning”. He also stipulated that any stations not implementing this commitment would be closed down. (Al-Quds newspaper, 18 February 1998). Nevertheless, these stations were reopened on 18 May 1998.

 

On 16 February 1998, the Ministry of Information had already issued a decision ordering all private radio and television stations working within the Autonomous Palestinian Areas no to “transmit any news or comments made by Palestinian officials related to developments in the Iraqi crisis and only to cover international news without comment”.

From the annual report of the PHRMG

 

8. Is there Israeli interference in the work of these stations?

 

As a consequence of failing to accept the Palestinian share in the use of the air waves and frequencies, Israeli settlers also use these air waves and thus interfere with the work of the stations. Not only does this force stations to change frequency but it also prevents the Authority from issuing permits as it cannot decide on which frequency the station will run. 

 

 

There is also Israeli pressure on the PA to close down stations directly or indirectly opposing Israeli interests. As an example, the Head of the Israeli army in the West Bank, Brigadier Ishaq Eitan, had asked the leader of the Palestinian national forces in the West Bank, Haj Ismail Jabr, to close down the eight television stations in February 1998 on the grounds that they transmitted news and pictures of demonstrations and flag-burning during the Iraqi crisis. When these two men met in the coordination office in Bethlehem, Haj Ismail Jabr expressed understanding of the Israeli position.      Al-Quds newspaper, 18.2.1998

 

 

Does the law regulate private stations?

 

There is no law on the audio-visual media, but according to an administrative memorandum issued by the Minister of Information, the Palestinian press law of 1995 is considered to be a reference point for dealing with private stations. Legislation on this matter is not possible before an agreement has been reached regarding the Palestinian share in the airwaves and before such details have been registered with the International Telecommunications Association.

                                                               PHRMG interview with al-Masri

 

The following are some of the problems that have arisen because of the absence of  such a law:

 

-         Permits issued for these stations are time bound (for a short period of time)

-         There has been interference by Ministries in each other’s work;

-         There has been interference by the security services in the work of these stations with the imposition of broad red lines depending exclusively on the mood of the security official in a given area; when such limits have been exceeded, the station has been closed down.

 

Why is there no private station in the Gaza Strip?

 

There is no private radio or television station in the Gaza Strip. It appears that he Authority is set on maintaining the official Palestine radio and television as the only functioning stations in the Strip. PHRMG therefore contacted Maher al-Masri in the Ministry of Information who refuted such an assertion. PHRMG also contacted one of the citizens who had applied for a permit to open a private television station in the Gaza Strip.

 

“We have not taken any official decision preventing the opening of stations in the Gaza Strip and we are ready to review any application presented to us and to take the correct decision if the conditions are fulfilled”                                  PHRMG interview with Maher al-Masri

 

The PHRMG has learnt that a person from Gaza Strip applied in June 1999 to establish a private TV station in the Gaza Strip: in October 1999 he has still not received a response.

 

 

Abuses committed against Palestinian journalists:

 

Abuse of Palestinian journalists for crossing the red line has varied in its nature and intensity. The 50 violations committed between 1994 and 1999 recorded by the PHRMG were of the following nature:

 

- Injury from gun shooting                                  2%

- Beatings                                                          12%

- Breaking or confiscation of cameras                  6%

- Confiscation films or videos                    8%

- Summoning, stopping or detaining           68%

- Raiding offices and confiscation of contents       6%

- Closure of offices                                            12%

- Signing commitments for the future                   12%

- Confiscation of press and / or personal IDs        4%

 

These abuses were not limited to one security service but were committed by several organs: the police, General Intelligence, National Security and Preventive Security. We would stress that two thirds of these violations took place in the Gaza Strip and that the police forces are responsible for a total of 38% of all abuses.

Parties responsible for abuse in percentage terms:

 

- The Police                                   38% Gaza    4% WB

- General Intelligence Service 22% Gaza    4% WB

- Preventive Security Service 6% Gaza      8% WB

- National Security Service              2% Gaza      6% WB                

 

Yearly breakdown of the 50 recorded violations in percentage terms:

 

1994                   6%

1995                  12%

1996                  30%

1997                  20%

1998                  24%

1999                   6%

 

There are no signs indicating an improvement in the situation. Abuses reached their highest level in 1996, fell in 1997, increased in 1998 and dropped a little for the first 9 months of 1999. Yet the question remains: are these figures indication enough or have past abuses led to increased self-censorship with a view to avoiding the Authority’s interference altogether?

 

 

Violations and Abuses committed by the Palestinian Security Services against journalists

 

22 May 1999

The criminal intelligence in Gaza arrested the writer of an article and the Chief Editor of al-Risala newspaper for publishing a report on the torture of a citizen in a Palestinian prison.

 

9 March 1999

A unit from General Intelligence broke into the house of journalist Fayed Abu-Shammala and confiscated videos, documents and press material. This was not the first time that Abu-Shammala has been abused: security guards at the entrance to the Presidential office had prevented him from entering to cover news in September of 1998 without providing reasons.

                    PHRMG interview with Abu-Shammala

8 March 1999

Men from the General Intelligence shot at the press office of Abdel-Salam Abu-‘Askar, broke into it and attempted to smash one of its doors.

 

December 1998

Members of the Palestinian Police arrested eight journalists from the Gaza Strip, after they had covered a march organized by the Popular Front. During the march, American and Israeli flags were burnt in protest against the American-British aggression against the people of Iraq. The PA also closed television stations and local radio stations, claiming that the former had screened marches in which flags were burnt and that such screening would harm Palestinian national security. One the same day the PA closed down three press offices working for Reuters, Associated Press and the Cinema Production Centre. Journalists arrested for several hours reported that their cameras had been confiscated and that two of them had been beaten by the police. The following day, the offices were reopened. 

 

December 1998

Members of National Security confiscated Ja’far Ishtayeh’s camera on the grounds that he had been filming a march in support of political prisoners in the Juneid detention center.

 

23 November 1998

During the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, police forces blocked the roads leading to the house of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. The police detained eleven journalists working for foreign agencies who were present at Sheikh Yassin’s house, because of their intention to record television interviews with him. They confiscated all cameras and films and told them that they required prior authorisation from Criminal Intelligence if they intended to conduct such interviews.

 

18 November 1998

The Political Security Department of the Palestinian Police in Gaza summoned Dr. Hamad, the Chief Editor of the weekly al-Risala (the Message). The paper reflects the point of view of al-Khalas (Salvation Party). The Police raised the matter of his paper’s publications, which it described as “hot” and warned him indirectly that he should take care to avoid such “hot” subjects.

 

13  September 1998

Saber Noureddin, a journalist who works as a correspondent for the “France Agency” in Gaza was summoned by the police and detained for ten hours. The day before he had been prevented from filming a rally organized by Hamas. After refusing to hand over his camera and the film,  both his personal and professional identification cards were confiscated by the police.

 

29 August 1998

A group of policemen heavily beat the journalist Muneer Abu Rizeq, the editor of Al-Hayat Al-Jadida newspaper, using weapons, fists and feet. His tape recorder and glasses were also broken. The grounds for this action was his presence at the Military Court in Gaza attending the trial of the two brothers Mohammed and Majdi Ibrahim al-Khaledi.

 

25 August 1998

Members of the Preventive Security Service (PSS) beat a photographer from Al-Hayat Al-Jadida newspaper, Naser Naser, who was subsequently taken to hospital. The PSS confiscated his camera and broke a second one belonging to journalist Majed al-Arouri. The beating and confiscation took place because the two journalists had refused to stop filming a sit-in by human rights organizations outside the house of the martyr Imad Awadallah:  the Palestinian Security Services had surrounded his house and had prevented the Awadallah family from leaving it. It is worth mentioning that the police refused to record the complaint Naser Naser made against the PSS and told him that they would only do so if it were made against an unknown party.

 

20 July 1998

The journalist Ahmad Khalil al-Mashharawi, 27 years of age, was summoned by the Intelligence Service because of a photograph he had taken of the (suddenly) bald journalist Majdi al-Turk: the security service had shaven his head. The person who interrogated him asked him: “In whose interest was this photograph taken?”

 

14 May 1998

Members of the National Security heavily beat journalist Imad al-Ifranji, who works as a correspondent for al-Quds newspaper, whilst he was covering clashes between Palestinian youngsters and Israeli occupation forces near the Ghosh Qatif settlement in Gaza Strip.

 

5 May 1998

Two members of the General Intelligence Service arrested journalist Abbas al-Momani from a press office in the Tannous building in Ramallah. Without  presenting him with an official warrant or a detention order, they asked al-Momani to accompany them. On 10 May, al-Momani escaped from prison after having been tortured but was arrested again the same day. He was finally released on 14 May after committing himself verbally not to mention the incident to anyone.

 

9 April 1998

The Palestinian police’s criminal investigation unit arrested the following Reuters correspondents in Gaza: Taher Shreiteh, Nidal al-Mughrabi, Ahmad Jaddallah, Shams Shana’a and Soudah Abu-Seif. All five were asked to sign an undertaking not to work again and not to cause disputes and troubles. All five refused. Following the intervention of Zakaria al-Talmes, the Head of the Journalists Association in Gaza, on the morning of 10 April 998, it was agreed that the journalists would undertake to be careful and precise in their work and that when reporting news they would respect the Palestinian press law.

 

17 March 1998

Criminal Intelligence prevented journalist Abdel-Rahim al-Qusseini (AP) and his colleague Abdel-Rahman Khabeisseh (WTN) from filming a women’s sit-in in front of the Nablus Governance office, which had been organised in support of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli and Palestinian prisons.

 

17 March 1998

The Preventive Security Service in Gaza detained Dr. Ghazi Hamad at the “Tal al-Hawa” detention center, because of an article he had written in al-Istiqlal (Independence) newspaper about the relationship between the PA and Palestinian citizens. He was released on 27 April 1998 without having been brought to  trial. His release was not authorised by the Attorney General. Dr. Hamad, who was tortured during his arrest, said: “They read my articles on the relationship between the citizen and the security services and beat me heavily with wires”.

 

7 March 1998

Security Services arrested journalist Nawaf al-‘Amer (Nablus Press Office).

 

20 February 1998

Members of National Security arrested journalist Nasser Ishtayeh and his brother Ja’far, both of whom are reporters for two foreign agencies, on the grounds that they had filmed both a march in Balata camp in support of Iraq as well as the burning of Israeli and American flags. All the footage was confiscated. Both journalists were released after two hours following intervention by their agencies.

 

December 1997

Members of National Security beat the journalist Ja’far Ishtayeh and detained him for six hours on the grounds that he had filmed a march in support of Iraq. He was asked to sign a commitment not to film scenes depicting incitement to violence, nor the burning of flags.                       

PHRMG interview with Ja’far Ishtayeh

 

 

 

On the same day, a police force broke into the Reuters office in Gaza and announced its closure for a period three months. The cause? The release of a film showing an interview with Adel Awadallah who is still accused by the Authority of taking part in the assassination of Mohey-eddin al-Sharif. The office was reopened on 15 April 1998.

 

26 October 1997

The journalist and human rights activist Khaled al-‘Amayreh was arrested by Preventive Security in Jericho after he had published a report in the weekly newspaper Sawt al-Haq wa al-Horiyeh (Voice of Rightfulness and Freedom) - published inside the green line - on the torture of Hamas detainees. He was released the following day after midnight.

 

30 May 1997

Members of Criminal Intelligence arrested the journalist Maher Farraj after ten at night and took him to police headquarters in Gaza. After one hour he was taken to the office of Colonel Talal Abu Zeid and was asked not to publish anything potentially provoking the PA. Colonel Zeid apportioned him with the responsibility for the publication of an article written by Dr. Ayoub Otman from al-Azhar University, entitled “On the Margin of the Report by the Monitoring Committee”, an article the Colonel considered as constituting incitement against the PA. He added that Mr. Farraj, as director of the newspaper, should not publish such an article. Farraj was detained until 4 am.

 

4 December 1996

The journalist Maher Farraj was summoned to the Intelligence Service in Gaza where he was asked by Colonel Mohammed al-Masri to present all reports to him before publication in al-Bilad (the Country) newspaper.

 

11 November 1996

A group of journalists were arrested and their films confiscated after they had covered a march organised by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) following a military attack committed by the Popular Front near the village of Surda, Ramallah. The journalists lodged a complaint with President Arafat and were released. “We understood that the President reacted positively in the favor of the journalists” said Majed al-Arouri, one of the journalists.

 

9 September 1996

The journalist Maher Farraj was summoned to the Ministry of the Interior in Gaza by the Director of Public Affairs, Omar, who asked him not to publish anything on the al-‘Ahd (the Oath) political party, a party affected by internal disputes.

 

19 June 1996

The journalist Maher Farraj, 32 years of age and director of al-Bilad (the Country) office in Gaza, was summoned to the Preventive Security headquarters where he was questioned by captain Ibrahim Abu el-Sheikh about a report published in the newspaper entitled “A thousand Shekels is the price of a permit for lorries to Gaza” and asked him to give him the source of the story. Farraj was summoned on a daily basis for one week, ending on 27 June 1996. His ID was taken away for two days for answering back to insults made against him by Abu el-Sheikh. His card was returned after the intervention of the Journalists Association in Gaza.

 

14 May 1996

Three members from the General Intelligence Service broke into the Office of France Agency (AFP) in Gaza City and arrested the journalist Fayez Ibrahim Noureddin on the grounds that he had published a photograph of some youngsters pushing a donkey into the sea, with the phrase “ Specialised in Donkeys!” written below the photo. Mr. Noureddin took the photo, but it had not been him who had added the phrase. Yet it is clear that his arrest followed an accusation that he had added the commentary. During his arrest one of the three persons who arrested him tied his hands behind his back, whilst the other two covered his head with a bag and pushed him violently into their vehicle. They put him on the floor of the car, kicked him heavily with their boots and insulted him. This behaviour continued until they reached their headquarters (al-Saraya) where one of them took off his boot and beat Noureddin with it. He then grabbed him by his neck and told him to curse himself.

 

After beating him for half an hour, they placed him between the metal door of the cell and the wall and pushed him violently. They then pushed him into the cell, and ordered him to stand with his arms in the air for two hours. They then brought a book and a pen and asked him to write his autobiography. He was taken to an interrogation room where three officials questioned him about the photograph and the person who had forced him to take it. He was asked whether he worked for French Intelligence, but Fayez refused to answer any questions: he believed that it was the Ministry of Information or the Journalists Association who had the right to question him and not the General Intelligence. He was finally asked to sign a commitment, which he did, whilst also telling his interrogators that he would lodge a complaint against them. Their response? “If you say one word, we’ll punish you”. He was released at 9 pm. An official from the Preventive Security Service contacted Fayez on the same day the photograph was published and asked him to come to their premises. Fayez refused and said that if they wanted to see, they should obtain an official summons from the Attorney General.

 

30 March 1996

The Security Services abused and beat the following Nablus journalists with clubs: Abdel-Rahman Khabeiseh, Hussam al-Qadah (al-Nahar correspondent) and Abdel-Rahim al-Qusseini.

 

7 March 1996

The journalist Muhsen al-Ifranji, 29 years of age, was arrested by members of the General Intelligence Service at his house in Gaza at around 10 pm. He was questioned about essays and articles he had published in al-Quds newspaper and was asked to sign a commitment not to harm the PA’s interests. Al-Ifranji was badly treated during his detention. Whilst being taken to an interrogation room, his head was put in a bag and his hands were tied behind his back. He told the PHRMG: “For 7 days I was alone in a cell and was interrogated three times a day, mainly at night. I was threatened. I had never expected to be put in such a position. I wish they would allow us to do our duty without suffering such abuse”. Muhsen’s detention lasted for 21 days. He was not charged and was not presented before a judge. No legal action was taken and he was released on 28 March 1996 .

 

6 March 1996

Palestinian Security Services prevented journalists from filming a student march organised by Hamas in Nablus and broke into the house of journalist Hassan al-Titi (Reuters) in order to confiscate footage of the march.

 

27 February 1996

‘Ala Saftawi was arrested by a police force after midnight because of his editorial article that had appeared in the 16 February 1996 edition of al-Istiqlal (Independence) newspaper, entitled “Oath and Responsibility”. The article spoke about the deteriorating security situation. During the interrogation, the police claimed that the article disrespected the President’s personality. Saftawi told them: “I never meant to disrespect the President. All I wanted to do was discuss the deteriorating security situation and to warn people about it”. He was detained for three days.

 

In 1996 the journalist (F.A) was summoned by Preventive Security following a report on the release of Hamas detainees from Palestinian prisons. He was asked by captain Ibrahim Abu-el-Sheikh as to how he had received information for that report. He was detained for five hours. The next day he was called in again by the same security service in “Tal el-Hawa” and was  questioned about the same report. “They told me that it wasn’t right to publish everything”. He was released after one and a half  hours.

 

24 February 1996

 A member of the police beat the journalist Nasser Ishtayeh, insulted him and smashed his camera on the grounds that he had been filming the transfer of caravans into “Yousef’s tomb” in Nablus. This incident occurred during the disturbances triggered by the opening of the tunnel near the al-Aqsa Mosque. The policeman’s security unit claimed later that the policeman’s actions were justified because he had wanted to prevent Nasser Ishtayeh from entering a closed military area. Nasser told the PHRMG: “I discovered later that the site wasn’t a declared closed military area and that the decision to prevent me from filming was taken by the policeman himself. I therefore filed a complaint against him at the governing office and was told later that he had been detained for 48 hours”.

 

February 1996

A unit from “Intelligence, Police and Preventive Security” detained a journalist from Jenin for a period of six months without bringing charges or bringing him to trial. He was interrogated about his relations with Hamas and about his correspondence with Islamic newspapers. “They were tough, rude, used insulting language and made me stand in a specific way (shabeh) for more that three hours.       PHRMG interview February 1996

A unit from “Intelligence, Police and Preventive Security” detained a journalist from Jenin for a period of six months without bringing charges or bringing him to trial. He was interrogated about his relations with Hamas and about his correspondence with Islamic newspapers. “They were tough, rude, used insulting language and made me stand in a specific way (shabeh) for more that three hours.       PHRMG interview

 

8 October 1995

The journalist Mohammed Taher el-Nounou was summoned to General Intelligence offices (al-Saraya) by the official Ayman al-Kafarneh. Before responding to the summons, he passed by the Ministry of Information and told them of the matter. He subsequently went to al-Saraya and met al-Kafarneh who asked him firstly about his source of information regarding Hamas’ communiqué on the delegation mediating between the PA and Hamas and secondly about its content, which had maintained that the delegation did not really represent Hamas. The report in question had been published in al-Nahar newspaper and had given al-Nounou as the source in Gaza. After some rounds of questioning, al-Kafarneh asked two men to blind-fold his eyes and he was pushed into a cell where he remained for two days. Al-Nounou told the PHRMG: “They used to let us out three times every day only for the purposes of relieving ourselves”. On the morning of 10 October 1995, they questioned him again whilst he was still blind-folded and beat him. He was then taken back to his cell and then to the office of the ex-Attorney General Khaled al-Qidrah. The latter asked him “not to be a trouble-maker and not to attack the PA”. He was then released.

 

August 1995

A gun was shot at the University Lecturer Dr. Abdel-Sattar Qassem after he had published an article in “al-Watan” (the Homeland) newspaper in which he criticised President Arafat and the PA. The article was entitled “Democracy in the Shadow of the President” and argued that the President did not accept individuals disagreeing with him or refusing to follow his orders.

 

It is not possible for a journalist to exercise his proper role in the media, unless his material and social rights are guaranteed and unless he receives all the suitable protection he requires. The Palestinian media is not directed and the evidence shows that the Ministry of Information has licensed a large number of press establishments. Tawfeeq Abu-Shomer, Director General of the Press Department in the Ministry of Information, in al-Quds newspaper on 1.4.1999.

 

On 21.5.1996, the Palestinian Journalists Association sent an open letter to members of the Palestinian Legislative Council saying: “We, the Palestinian journalists, continue to suffer whilst trying to obtain news and official information from our PA and from political parties. We continue to discover that some officials, ministers and leaders, or those below them, prefer to speak only to foreign or even Israeli reporters “. They add: “ We document hereby that the various Security Services have arrested or abused more than 25 journalists for reasons related to their work. We have found that in most of the cases, such action was in no way justified to the extent that some people nowadays avoid working directly with the press whilst others prefer to work secretly for the local security services in order to obtain news: this is often harmful to our PA”.

 

The Security Services confiscated the weekly magazine of the “Fatah” movement al-Sahl al-Falastini (The Palestinian Plain) because its carrying of an article critical of the Palestinian police. They also arrested the author of the article, Zaki al-Kilani.

 

12 July 1995

Colonel Mohammed al-Masri from General Intelligence summoned journalist Imad al-Ifranji who worked for al-Quds Press agency. He interrogated al-Ifranji for five days about a report that he had published. During the interrogation his head was put in a bag and finally he was forced to sign a commitment that he would never disobey the PA. Failure to do so would lead to tough punishment. Colonel al-Masri threatened to speak with the director of the al-Quds Press agency as soon as the PA had moved into the West Bank. He added that the arrest of al-Ifranji was to be seen as a message to his agency. The agency should now be aware as to which type of reports to publish. Al-Masri also threatened Imad by telling him that he would personally be held responsible for any negative report published in Gaza.

 

 

14 May 1995

Palestinian police closed down the premises of al-Watan (the Homeland) newspaper, following a decision of the State Security Court. The newspaper was prevented from appearing and one day after his arrest, a decision was taken to imprison its Editor-in-Chief Sheikh Sayed Abu-Musameh for three years on the grounds that he had published articles of an inciteful nature against the PA. A judgment in absentia was also handed down against the Editor, Dr. Ghazi Hamad, condemning him to two years imprisonment. Both judgements were not executed and Sheikh Abu-Musameh was released after eight months following a deal between the PA and Hamas.      

PHRMG interview with Dr. Ghazi Hamad

 

February 1995

The following six employees from al-Istiqlal (the Independence) newspaper were arrested by Palestinian Intelligence: Editor-In-Chief ‘Ala Saftawi, ‘Atiyeh Abu Mansour, Khaled Sadeq, Zakaria al-Madhoun, Mohammed Fayyad and Nahed Kutkut. Saftawi was released after 23 days. The others remained in prison for three months.

 

October 1994

The General Intelligence Service in Gaza detained journalist Taher Shreiteh, who works as a reporter for Reuters, for six days, on the grounds that his agency had distributed a film on the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Nahshon Vaxman. The Reuters correspondents in Gaza, Shams Odeh, Sawwah Abu-Seif and Ahmad Jadallah, were also arrested and released the same day.

 

April 1994

Members of Force 17 arrested the journalist Imad al-Ifranji, who at the time worked for the al-Quds Press agency, and searched his house from where they took two fax machines and a video. They interrogated him in al-Saraya for more than half an hour and took him to a military camp in Jabalya dealing with Presidential security, where they questioned him about his profession. He was taken back to al-Saraya after two days, where he stayed for a further two days. Imad told the PHRMG: “They released me after one am. I asked about the reason for my arrest but they would not say”.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table showing violations committed against journalists by the different security services, as recorded by the PHRMG

 

Reason for Violation	Security Service responsible	Violation	Work-place Work-Agency	Date
1. Covering  news on  Hamas activist Imad Awadallah after his escape from prison on 14.8.98	Preventive Security	Beating and breaking of camera	Al-Hayat al-Jadida newspaper	15.8.1998
2. Covering the trial at the State Security Court handing down a capital sentence	The Police	Beating	Al-Hayat al-Jadida newspaper	29.8.1998
3. Distributing an interview with a Hamas (wanted) activist Imad Awadallah	The Police / Gaza	Detaining five journalists for a few hours, closing the press office and signing of  commitment	Reuters	9.4.1998
4. Filming an interview with Adel Awadallah	General Intelligence, Ramallah	Arresting a journalist for nine days and  severe torture	Reuters	5.5.1998
5. Covering a Hamas demonstration	The Police / Gaza	Detaining a journalist for ten hours and confiscating his personal and professional ID cards	French agency AP	13.9.1998
6. Covering the clashes between Palestinians and Occupation soldiers near Ghosh Qatif	National Security / Gaza	Beating a journalist	Al-Quds newspaper	14.5.1998
7. Conducting interviews with Sheikh Ahmad Yassin on the eve of the Wye Agreement	The Police / Gaza	Detaining eleven journalists for few hours, & signing a commitment	Foreign agencies	23.11.1998
8. Filming a march in support of Iraq in which American & Israeli flags were burnt	National Security / the West Bank	Detaining journalists for two hours and confiscation of films	Foreign agencies	20.2.1998
9. Filming a march in support of Iraq	National Security / the West Bank	Beating a journalist, detaining him for six hours and signing a commitment	A Foreign agency	1. 1997
10. Filming a march supporting political detainees in the Authority’s prisons	National Security / the West Bank	Confiscation of  camera	A foreign agency	12.1998
11. Filming  Israelis  moving caravans into Joseph’s tomb in Nablus	The Police / Nablus	Beating and insulting a journalist and breaking his camera	A foreign agency	24.10.1996
12. Publishing some “hot” articles	The Police / Gaza	Summoning a journalist and threatening him	Al-Risala newspaper	18.11.1998
13. Covering a march by the PFLP in support of Iraq	The Police / Gaza	Detaining eight journalists for a few hours, confiscating their films and beating two of them		12.1998
14. Covering a Hamas march	Security services / the West Bank	Breaking into a journalist’s house and taking some material	A foreign agency	6.3.1996
15. An article about the relationship between the PA and the citizen	Preventive Security	Detaining the journalist for ten hours	Al-Istiqlal newspaper	17.3.1996
16.	Security Services	Beating with clubs	Local newspapers	30.3.1996
17. Publishing articles inciting action against the PA	The Police / Gaza	Closing down the newspaper and imprisoning the chief editor for two years	Al-Risala newspaper	14.5.1995
18. Publishing a film showing an Israeli soldier  kidnapped by Hamas	General Intelligence / Gaza	Detaining a suspected journalist for six days	A foreign agency	10.1994
19. Covering a communiqué by Hamas criticising the President	The Police / Gaza	Detaining a journalist for 10 days	A foreign agency	10.1994
20. Covering a march by the PFLP after an operation in the village of Surda	Security Services / the West Bank	Detaining a group of journalists	Foreign agencies	11.12.1996
21.	A unity of security services	Arresting a journalist for six months	A reporter for few Islamic newspapers	2.1996
22. Writing an article criticising President Arafat and the PA		Shooting and injuring a journalist	Al-Watan newspaper	8.1995
23. Writing an article about the bribes that officials in the PA receive in return for permits to enter Israel	Preventive Security / Gaza	Summoning a journalist each day for one week, confiscating his ID and insulting him	Al-Bilad newspaper	30.5.1997
24. Publishing an article about a report on the monitoring board	Criminal Intelligence / Gaza	Detaining a journalist for 6 hours at night	Al-Bilad newspaper	30.5.1997
25.	General Intelligence / Gaza	Summoning a journalist and asking him to present reports to the authorities before publication	Al-Bilad newspaper	4.12.1996
26. An article criticising the Palestinian Police	Security Services	Arresting the writer of an article and confiscating his monthly magazine	Fatah monthly magazine (al-Sahl al-Falastini)
27.	General Intelligence / Gaza	Shooting at a press office and breaking into the office	A press office	8.3.1999
28.	General Intelligence / Gaza	Breaking into a house and confiscation of video footage	BBC	8.3.1999
29. Publishing a report in al-Nahar newspaper	General Intelligence / Gaza	Arresting a journalist for two days and treating him badly	Al-Nahar newspaper	8.10.1995
30.	Force 17	Arresting a journalist, searching his house and confiscating fax  and video machines	Al-Quds press agency	4.1994
31.	General Intelligence / Gaza	Arresting a journalist for 8 days, signing a commitment and threatening an agency official	Al-Quds press agency	12.7.1995
32. A press photo of youngsters pushing a donkey into the sea	General Intelligence / Gaza	Arresting a journalist for a few hours, bad treatment & signing a commitment	AP	14.5.1996
33. A report on the torturing of Hamas detainees in  PA prisons	Preventive Security / the West Bank	Arrest for one day	“Sawt al-Haq wa al-Horiyeh” newspaper	1996
34. An article about the security situation in Palestine	The Police / Gaza	Arrest of a journalist for 3 days	Al-Istiqlal newspaper	27.2.1996
35.	General Intelligence / Gaza	Arrest for 21 days	Al-Quds newspaper	7.3.1996
36. A report on the release of Hamas prisoners	Preventive Security / Gaza	Summoning to  authority’s offices for a few hours on two days	Al-Hayat al-Jadida newspaper	1996
37. Finding  documents and a photo of a “bald” journalist after he was relesed from PA prisons	Military Itelligence / Gaza	Arrest for eight days and signing a commitment		20.7.1998
38. A source of a report on unfair treatment for nominees to use the media in elections	Force 17 / the West Bank	Arrest for one day	Reporters Sans Frontiers	2.1.1996
39. A  4 year-old report on a meeting between Jibreel al-Rujoub & an Israeli official	Preventive Security / the West Bank	Detention for three days with severe torture	An Arab newspaper abroad	10.5.1997
40. Live transmission of a PLC session	The Police / the West Bank	Arrest for 6 days	Al-Quds educational TV	20.5.1997
41.	A Security Service / Gaza	Arrest for 9 days	Al-Risala newspaper	1.8.1997
42.	General Intelligence / the West Bank	Arrest for a month and closure of television station	Afaaq TV station	23.9.1997
43. A report on the torture of Hamas detainees	Preventive Security / the West Bank	Arrest for one day	Sawt al-Haq wa al-Horiyeh weekly	26.10.1997
44. A report about “Zahwa”, the President’s daughter	The Police / Gaza	Closing down of newspaper for two months and a half	Al-Watan newspaper	5.1995
45. A report criticising the President	The Police / Gaza	Closing down of newspaper for a month	Al-watan newspaper	5.8.1995
46. Articles in the newspaper	The Police & the General Intelligence / Gaza	Summoning & beating of publisher	Al-Watan newspaper	Several times on several occasions
47.	General Intelligence - Gaza	Breaking into  newspaper’s offices   and confiscation of material	al-Risala newspaper
48. A report criticising the way in which the PA spends aid from Egypt	The Police / Gaza	Closure of newspaper for 3 months	Al-Risala newspaper	4.9.1997
49. Publishing a report on the torture of a citizen in a Palestinian prison	Criminal Intelligence / Gaza	Arrest of writer of article & of Chief Editor for two days	Al-Risala newspaper	22.5.1999

 

 

Incitement

 

Less than one month after the signing of the Wye River Agreement, President Yasser Arafat issued a special presidential decree on incitement on 19 November 1998. Subsequently, a Palestinian-American-Israeli committee, the Committee for the prevention of incitement, was formed. Its role is to monitor cases of incitement and to issue special reports and recommendations. The Wye Memorandum, signed on 22 November 1998, stipulates in its Article 3 that such a decree be issued and that such a committee be formed:

 

“ A. Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation that deals with the same subject.

 

A)     A U.S.- Palestinian - Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli, Palestinian and U.S. sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee.”

 

This decree  is illegal and seeks to justify the curtailing of freedom of thought and expression. Its language consists of flexible phrases, which may be interpreted in different ways.

 

The decree itself stated that

 

“the following acts are considered illegal in all the Palestinian governances: inciting racial discrimination, encouraging violent actions that are against the law, showing disrespect for different religions, using violence or inciting the use of violence that harms relations with brotherly and foreign states, forming illegal societies that commit or incite the committing of crimes, stirring up the masses to change matters by illegal use of force, incitement to sedition and incitement to breach agreements between the  PLO and brotherly or foreign states”.

 

 

 

Why is the presidential decree on incitement considered  to be illegal?

 

The preface of the presidential decree on the prevention of incitement states

 

“after referring to the constitutional and legal rules in force, to law # 5 for 1995 dealing with powers and legislation, to the penal law # 74 of 1936 and to its amendments, to the penal law # 16 for 1960 in use in the Palestinian Districts of the West Bank, to the PLO Code of 1979 and to decision # 1 of 1994 on the applicability of rules and orders in use prior to 5 May 1967 in the Palestinian Territories …”.

 

It is clear that the President bases the legitimacy of this decree on all applicable laws in force prior to 1967. However, on the basis of our research and the conclusions of the workshop organized by the al-Haq organization on legislation aimed at preventing incitement, it is clear that Article 28 of the 1962 Gazan constitution confers responsibility for the issuing of laws exclusively on the Legislative Council. The Executive Authority may only issue laws in emergency cases when the Legislative Council has not been convened. Article 28 provides that

 

“if circumstances require the drawing up of urgent arrangements that cannot be postponed, then the Executive Council may issue decisions with the force of law related to such circumstances. These decisions must be presented to the Legislative Council when it convenes and are to be considered valid unless the Council decides to annul them”.

 

When the President issued the decree on 19 November 1998, the Legislative Council was in session. Consequently, the decree violates the contents of its own preface (Article 28 of the 1962 Constitution) and is to be considered illegal.

 

The Triparty Committee on Incitement: its function and some of the problems is faces

 

In accordance with Article 3B of the Wye River Memorandum, it was agreed to form this committee. The Palestinian side of this committee is headed by President Arafat’s advisor Marwan Kanafani. The task of this mission id limited to monitoring cases of incitement and the issuing reports and recommendations on the matter.

 

Some of the basic obstacles this committee faced included the definition of incitement. After both parties were unable to agree on a solution, the American party successfully presented the solution of judging each  incident on its own merits. This solution derives from the American Supreme Court in which one of the justices remarked “… I know incitement when I see it”.

 

The dispute concerning the definition of incitement was caused by two factors:

 

a)     Whether only actions could give rise to incitement or whether words could also qualify. The Palestinian argued in favour of actions only, whereas the Israeli side insisted that incitement could also be verbal.

b)     Whether the source of the verbal incitement could be official or also unofficial. The Palestinian side argued in favour of only the former, whilst the Israeli side argued that the nature of the source was irrelevant. (As recorded by Marwan Kanafani, the Head of the Palestinian side to the Committee On Incitement, during the workshop “Legislation preventing incitement and ambitions to build a democratic system”, organized by al-Haq on 17 February 1999)

 

At present, the work of the committee is limited to the exchange of complaints. For instance, the Israeli side would accuse Palestinian radio or a Palestinian of having transmitted information on a particular matter and the Palestinian side would respond in kind. 

Testimony of Kanafani during the al-Haq Workshop of 17 February 1999

 

 

How does the Presidential decree and the special committee on incitement affect press freedom?

 

The Presidential decree had both obvious and less obvious consequences on the local press. Concerning the former, there has clearly been an increase in violations and abuses against journalists who write about, meet with or show interest in the political opposition, and in particular with regard to opinions critical of the U.S., Israel and the peace process. Some of the more hidden consequences include an increase in self-censorship among journalists, leading almost inevitably to an uncritical reporting of the official point of view. Thus journalists hope to avoid questioning or the closure of their press agencies.

 

The very first of the abuses taking place pursuant to the Wye River Agreement was the arrest of eight individuals who were on their way to the house of Sheik Ahmad Yassin to conduct some interviews with him. Amongst the violations following the issuing of the Presidential decree features the closure of some television stations on the basis that they covered the American-British aggression against Iraq. The major negative aspect of the decree was its ambiguous use of language and its lack of definition of the term “incitement”. This gave the Authority the opportunity to use the decree at any time to suppress freedom of expression.

 

“… and consequently this decree will remain a word directed towards the Palestinian media - visual, heard and written - with the result that political freedom will deteriorate. The decree will turn the media into mouthpieces that will repeat the views of political or security officials; if it does not do so, the media will be closed and its employees will be imprisoned or made redundant, which will in turn create other unforeseeable difficulties”.

View of Tayseer al-Zobri, Director of the Palestinian Media Establishment, al-Haq Workshop of 17 February 1999

 

Are their any special laws preventing incitement in other countries? Does the Presidential decree respect international human rights standards?

 

There are laws concerning incitement in many parts of the world, although these laws are not singled out by the legislator and generally form part of a state’s penal law. (As an example, incitement to avoid paying taxes is a crime, as provided for under tax laws.)

Dr. Amin Mekki, First technical advisor to the UN Commission office in al-Haq Workshop of 17 February 1999

 

The penal law of 1936 applicable in the Gaza Strip, to which the Presidential decree on incitement refers, includes provisions for crimes that include an element of incitement. An example is provided by a number of offences relating to public order: incitement to riot or mutiny in the armed forces, incitement to the stirring up of disputes between religions and races, incitement to civil war and incitement to spreading of false news.

 

The 1936 law is inconsistent with human rights principles, because it was designed primarily to endorse the Authority of the King and of the High Commissioner. It is a law that clearly requires revision.

                                                                             Same previous resource

 

 

 

 

 

Television and Radio Stations:

caught between reality and ambitions to develop

By Omar Nazzal, Director of Watan TV - Ramallah

                            

Establishment and expansion

 

During the Israeli occupation of Palestinian cities since 1967, the Israeli Authorities released permits for a number of local television stations in cities north of the West Bank, after other Arab cities in the triangle had been given such permits. These other Arab cities had managed to develop television broadcasting, both in cities occupied in 1948 as well as in other Palestinian cities, on a large scale.

 

When the Israeli military redeployment from Palestinian land was executed, the Palestinian Ministry of Information supervised television broadcasts and paved the way for the establishment of a number of other stations in the West Bank by granting them authority to broadcast television and radio material under limited conditions. Insodoing, the number of these stations peaked at 40, although districts in Gaza were refused such a permit, despite the large number of applications made.

 

Other Experiences

 

As a result of the above development, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) became the third Arab country (after Lebanon and Iraq) to permit the existence of private television and radio stations.

 

In Lebanon, more than 50 television and radio stations - most of them belonging to factions and political figures and forces - were established as a result of the political chaos during the previous 20 years. Over the past two years, the Lebanese government has been seeking the reorganise the sector and has approved a law decreasing the number of operating stations and limiting the freedom of expression of those that remain.

 

In Iraq, there is only one non-governmental station known as al-Shabab TV (Youth TV) that is run by Odai, the son of President Saddam Hussein.

Over the last few years, many private Arab satellite stations, operating from European capitals, have been established. In some sense, these stations belong to the Arab countries they represent.

 

In the West, there is no such thing as a government-run media and a developed and effective private media exists in its place. Even though there is no such thing as a Ministry of Information in the US, federal law prohibits the government from owning the media or influencing it in any way.

 

Differences between Palestinian Stations

 

One cannot consider the various private stations in Palestine to be similar. Some differences are more significant than others. The most significant may be summarized as follows.

 

1.     The media message

 

Some stations set themselves clear goals as to the message they wish to convey. They achieve these goals via their private programmes and news coverage, including through programmes transmitted via Arab Satellite. Other stations do not seek to convey particular messages and only redirect programmes from Arab Satellite stations. The local programmes that these stations broadcast, are nothing more than games and personal dedications which lack creativity and meaning.

 

2.     National and social orientation

 

Related to the first point, some stations function in order to fulfill (or to contribute to the fulfilment of) national goals as well as to the building of Palestinian society by deepening outlooks and through the fostering of positive social relations (and the rejection of negative ones). In addition, these stations play a national role by exposing violations committed by Israel and by facing the Israeli media and its provocative campaigns. Other stations are completely absent, working intentionally or unintentionally for the deepening of social negativity and for a decrease in development.

 

3.     The technical level

 

Broadcast is in itself an easy and inexpensive method. Methods include the necessary means to transmit the sound and picture in a way that is straightforward for the viewer to grasp. The difference here only appears in terms of the geographical area desired by the broadcasting stations. All stations suffer from poor technical support. The technical equipment used is not adequate for effective television broadcasting. This situation is mainly related to the instability of these stations, an issue discussed later in this article. A number of these stations lack the most basic technical support, whether it be the instruments used for production and broadcast premises or the safety of the location.

 

4.     Employees

 

This is one of the most important and obvious points of weakness or strength. Employees in stations vary from the staff consisting of only the owner and his family members (including his children), through stations in which the level of education of its employees does not exceed high school-level, to those where employees are educated and qualified for technical and media work.

 

5.     Commercial advertising and income

 

Even in commercial advertising, there is a considerable difference between stations, whether these concern production, broadcasting, set prices or competition. There are rules and regulations regulating advertising stipulating that the length of a commercial should not exceed 60 seconds and providing that commercial advertising should not exceed 8 minutes per hour of broadcast. Commercials are also to be clear and original. There are other rules binding the party wanting to advertise and the party producing the advertisement. There are companies that specialise in commercial advertisement, whilst the role of television stations is only limited to the broadcasting of these advertisements. None of the stations follow this particular rule. In addition, some stations have obtained and still receive illegal funding in return for the production and broadcast of programmes in favour of the party providing the funds.

 

Broadcasting wave-lengths

 

Stations have faced and are still facing a serious problems, because of the lack of available waves that may be used free from interference by other waves. This problem is primarily related to the agreements made with Israel and with the agreement and coordination with the International Communication Unity (ICU).

 

The Taba Agreements gave Palestinians the right to use six television wave-lengths whilst leaving the door open for the use of further wave-lengths. The six wave-lengths were used by Palestinian television. Yet there was still interference by Israel and other actors. To-date, the Palestinians have been unable to obtain more wave-lengths, despite the fact that there is a desperate need for additional transmission. The negotiating committee that in charge of communications has sought permission for additional broadcasting possibilities, but to no avail. This and other committees have faced a great deal of inertia on the part of the Israelis concerning the application of the agreement. This is compounded by interference with transmission frequencies by neighboring countries as well as by countries further afield. The ICU has failed to intervene with a view to solving this problem.

 

A further complicating factor is the prohibition, imposed by the Ministries of Communication and Information, on the use of low frequency waves VL and VHL, whilst not prohibiting the use of UHF high frequency waves, which are already used in accordance with the ways described above.

 

In conclusion, most stations function on inefficient wave-lengths. This situation decreases broadcast capacity and prevents stations reaching viewers further afield. In addition, wave-lengths are exposed to interference by Israeli: local stations were forced to change their wave length more than once, a situation justifiably irritating viewers.

 

Incitement

 

Incitement is a word that does not have one single meaning. Any individual could use this term in a way that suits their goals and interests. The following will point out the three major understandings of the word.

 

1.     Incitement as a synonym for media activity

 

There is no such thing as a media-outlet, whether it be governmental or private, that does not have a certain goal. Usually the media tends to rely on objective facts and uses its energy and capabilities to explain these facts in a manner that furthers its own goals. Regardless of the way in which the media seeks to bring out the truth or explain it, the consequence will always be a form of incitement in one way or another. Thus the term may be considered to be a synonym for media activity: the media cannot exist without being accused of inciting, even if this incitement is neither political nor national in character.

 

2.     Incitement according to the Israeli understanding of the term

 

In light of the first attempt at analysing the term, Israeli accusations that the Palestinian media engages in incitement should not come as a surprise. Both the Israeli and Palestinian media should not let themselves

be affected adversely by accusations of incitement:  there is already a constant dispute between these two parties.  How can we as Palestinians fail to report on the confiscation of Palestinian homes in Jerusalem by Israeli settlers? How can fail to call on those whose homes were confiscated to hold on to their rights and to remain in their homes? Such calls amount to incitement for Israel. Do we therefore desist from reporting?

 

A problematic element to the reporting is that the Palestinian media tends to exaggerate an issue in order to respond to Israeli claims. In order to dismiss accusations of incitement, the Palestinian media-outlets turn to accusing each other. Some do so by using certain expressions or by discussing issues far removed from the interests of the Palestinian public. At is at this point that the Israeli media, which is more clear and precise when engaging in incitement, becomes the winner in the incitement war: and we end up trying to justify ourselves.

 

3.     Incitement according to the PA’s understanding of the term

 

In the eyes of the PA and of some security forces, incitement is regularly committed by private Palestinian television and radio stations. These stations have consequently become a target for the security services concerned. The closure of private stations and the taking of measures against these stations has become a matter of course whenever a sensitive incident occurs in the Palestinian Territories or even far afield, such as events in Iraq showed us. Even though the Palestinian Territories are open to all of the Arab, foreign and Israeli media, full coverage of any incident remains an unfulfilled goal. At times, the media criticizes the Palestinian Authority in order to fulfill self-interests. This situation tarnishes the reputation of the PNA, whilst the Palestinian press and journalists become victims and are accused of incitement. Despite the fact that television and radio stations are not operating on the basis of a new draft law prepared by the PLC, Palestinian journalists do operate according to the provisions of the Palestinian Press Law. This does not, however, provide sufficient protection for these journalists.

 

Development and Competition

 

The fact that there are twenty six television stations and seven radio stations is extraordinary. Due primarily to technical constraints, the airwaves of the Palestinian Territories cannot cater for such a large number of stations. Reasons for the excess in stations include society’s need for a multi-purpose media phenomena (mental, political, cultural and artistic aspects), has been made possible because of the state of disorder in the use of frequencies and the fact that the broadcast of these stations sometimes only covers a limited area, in some cases only a small neighbourhood in one city. The second issue is related to the first: since the audience in a certain region can only watch a limited number of stations, so people sense some kind of comparison between them, and thus choose their preferred station that provides satisfaction. This state of affairs will not continue for much longer, as these stations plan to expand their geographical coverage, thus making it possible for the viewer to benefit from a larger choice of stations. If this happens, the weaker stations lacking technical facilities will disappear and new investors will be encouraged to establish stations with bigger and better resources. Such open and free competition will lead to better quality and expanded choice, benefiting the interest of the viewer. If we consider the amount of investment needed for opening such stations, the limited income of our small economy and the unsettled labor market, it is easy to conclude that the number of stations will definitely decrease in the future.

 

Specialization

 

In such an atmosphere of competition, specialization, absent until now, will become the norm. The western experience has shown that having specialized stations (sport, economics, news and politics, childrens programmes, religion….) is successful. The viewer’s needs and interests will be more satisfied. Political parties may also have a role to play with stations dedicated to getting political messages across. This happened in Lebanon for a number of years.

 

Production and Protection of Ownership

 

In this process of development of these stations, the production of these TV stations, i.e. programs and news or even commercials, becomes a basic and vital matter. Production may develop to include Palestinian drama programmes, especially if more investment is forthcoming and if the state supports this field. It could, afterall, become on of the principle resources of national income, as has been the case in Syria. In addition, Palestinian production will become a necessity to encourage professional Palestinians in this scope to come back to their homeland once a law protecting ownership and rights in the audio visual field has been issued. This will be even more necessary if a pan-Arab agreement is reached in the region.

 

Clearly these ideas depend to a great extent on the fulfilment of the Palestinian national goal of independence. Once achieved, there will be no excuse for Palestinians continuing with their piracy actions (such as transmitting programs from satellite stations without considering the rights of other stations).

 

The necessity for increased local production both in quantity and quality  and the factor of competence discussed above, will encourage a number of stations - those with experience and facilities - to end their broadcasting and to refocus on production.

 

Merging and Coalition

 

Competition and the need for development will lead to a new reality which will force television stations to engage in close cooperation and eventually to merge and unite in the form of one strong station. Previous experiences tell us that this is possible: five stations distributed throughout different regions of the West Bank merged in October 1998 to form one station, the “Jerusalem TV network”. A similar initiative took place when “The Arab United Co.” was established. Both attempts failed, because subsequently circumstances changed too rapidly. Another example is the Israeli television station  Channel Two, which is owned by three different companies. These share broadcasting time and have achieved excellent success.

 

The Legal Situation

 

Another important issue is the legal position of these television stations and the prospect of having a law which organises their work and existence.

 

According to the 1995 Press Law, the Ministry of Information is the only party with power and jurisdiction over television stations. The Ministry has issued permits for the stations to function and it is still the party with control over the work and legal regulation of these stations. As for the role of the Ministry of Interior, it believes itself to be in competition with the Ministry for Information. The latter issues yearly permits to the stations, renewable when a station’s work has been “acceptable” according to the standards of the Ministry. A further condition is that the owner of a station must receive a “good conduct certificate” from the Ministry of Interior. On several occasions, the Ministry of Interior has used its security organs to close stations and to arrest their owners and directors.

The Ministry of Communications also believes that it must have a responsibility over the stations, since they use restricted frequencies. The Ministry, however, has little jurisdiction in this field as it faces the uncompromising Israeli position on broadcasting. Negotiations with Israel will solidify the Israeli position.

 

Taking all these complications into account, the Council of Ministers issued a decision on the 5 June 1997, confirming the right to freedom of expression of political ideas and that Palestinian air-space is open to all political affiliations. The decision also authorised the Minister of information, Yasser Abed Rabbo, to form a special committee to study the current position of television stations. The committee was formed of representatives from the concerned ministries, members of the television stations and some correspondents and technicians. Disagreements within the committee hampered progress. Subsequently, the Minister of Information issued a limited number of new temporary permits. This, however, did not protect the stations from interference by security organs.

 

Trade Union protection

 

In mid 1997 the Union of Radio and Television Stations in Palestine was founded. It included the majority of the up and running stations, and had two central aims: to protect the interests of the stations and to organise their work and their relationship with political officials. Although the Union failed to succeed in executing its suggested role, it created a sense of unity and cooperation between its members. This was reflected in the decision by stations from the north of the West Bank to go on strike following the closure of some stations in the District of Ramallah.

 

The Audio-Visual Project Law

 

This project was put forward by the Ministry of Information and was  based on the peculiarity of the Palestinian situation and on a similar law used in Lebanon. The Ministry also held some workshops and seminars to discuss this project and subsequently made some alterations. Yet it was to remain a draft project and was never presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council for discussion on the grounds that its conceptual basis presupposes that the Palestinian Authority has sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories. Until such a time and until this project receives approval by the Legislative Council, the work of television stations will continue to face obstacles and abuses based on unpredictable moods and interests within the Palestinian community.

 

Conclusion

 

Regardless of all the circumstances surrounding the establishment and the work of these stations, their very existence represents in itself an extraordinary experience in our Arab world.

 

It also reflects the uniqueness of the Palestinian situation and expresses Palestinian’s commitment to the principles of democracy and freedom of expression. We may therefore be confident that these stations will develop in the future and that some of them may even become satellites for the Arab world and for the world, in its unified bid for establishing a modern civilization, in general.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Maher al-Masri                                    12^th Sept.1999

Director General

Press and Publications Dept.

Ministry of Information

Ramallah – Palestine

 

 

 

National Greetings,

 

Subject:        Our report on “Media in Palestine: Between the PNA’s

                   Hammer and the Anvil of Self-Censorship”

 

The PHRMG is happy to present its above mentioned human rights report for the attention of the Ministry of Information, for your comments and amendments, if applicable, to have an official response from the Ministry to be attached to the report when it is published.

 

 

Many thanks for your cooperation.

 

 

Yours truly,

 

 

Bassem Eid

Director General

PHRMG

                            

 

 

Palestinian National Authority

Ministry of Information

 

16.2.1998

Decision

 

With obligation to the law and the observed regulations, and in order to organize the work of the audio-visual stations, and put an end to the current chaos in the unsystematic increase that lack professional requirements in a way that harms the high national interest.

And with reference to the articles of the Press Law of 1995, and the articles of the communications law of 1996, and the articles of the audio-visual law project, and the decision of the PNA Cabinet issued on 6.6.97 related to organizing the work of the audio-visual stations, I decide not to issue permits, and close the following stations:

 

1. Qasr al-Nile TV, Nablus
2. al-Fajr al-Jadeed TV, Tulkarem
3. Hebron Radio, Hebron
4. Watani Atlas TV, Nablus
5. Tulkarem Central TV, Tulkarem
6. al-Bilad Radio, Jenin
7. Nagham Radio, Qalqiliya

 

This decision is considered valid from its date, and all parties concerned are to be informed for action and immediate implementation.

 

 

Yasser Abed-Rabbo

Minister of Information

Chairman of the Commission

For Audio-Visual Stations Coordination

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestinian National Authority

Ministry of Information

 

18.5.1998

Decision

 

With obligation to the observed laws, and based on the Press Law of 1995, and with reference to the articles of the audio-visual law project, and the decision of the Cabinet dated 6.6.97, therefore, I decide to reopen the stations that completed the professional required conditions from the eight stations that were closed, and they are:

 

1. Qasr al-Nile TV, Nablus
2. al-Fajr al-Jadeed TV, Tulkarem
3. Hebron Radio, Hebron
4. Watani Atlas TV, Nablus
5. Tulkarem Central TV, Tulkarem
6. Nagham Radio, Qalqiliya

 

This decision is considered valid from its date, all parties concerned are to be informed for action and implementation.

 

 

Yasser Abed-Rabbo

Minister of Information

Chairman of Commission

For Audio-Visual Stations Coordination

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestinian National Authority

Preventive Security H.Q.

 

 

 

Date:  17.5.1999

 

 

 

To: (Brother) Director of Police, Bethlehem District

       May God protect him

 

 

National Greetings,

 

Following instructions from his excellency the President (Arafat), al-Ru’aa (Shepherds) TV that transmits in Bethlehem District is to be closed, because it crossed the recognized limits for local stations.

 

 

With my revolutionary greetings,

 

 

(Your brother)

Colonel Jibreel al-Rujoub

Head of Preventive Security

Northern Governances (West Bank)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reply and comments of the Ministry of Information

On the PHRMG report

 

Mr. Bassem Eid                                            26.9.1999

Director of the PHRMG

 

Greetings,

 

After thanking you for giving us the opportunity to review your report

“Media in Palestine: Between the PNA’s Hammer and the Anvil of Self-Censorship” before publishing it, we stress our gratitude for the effort deployed and confirm the following:

 

First: Judging the PNA in general or its policy towards media in Palestine in particular, must set out from its privacy or the factors that affect it, specially as the nightmare of the Israeli occupation with its aggressive military policies and its measures against press and journalists that exceeded all the boundaries in which the Palestinian media move.

The responsibility of the Israeli occupation is not limited to the direct policies and measures that it takes, but also in taking the agreements signed between the two sides, the Palestinian and the Israeli, as a base to launch a political and media campaign, and practice a group of different pressures with various excuses, labelled under what Israel considers uprooting the infra-structure of violence and terrorism, and all that gives them life and support.

We shouldn’t mix here between:  a) the policies and measures taken, or might be taken by the PNA, who works to fulfil the Palestinian rights and wring freedom and independence for the Palestinian people. The PNA is in most of the cases forced to take measures related to the higher national interest or to protect a party, or parties, involved in the case.

And  b) the policies and measures that are carried out or committed by the occupation. Those policies and measures are produced by the occupation whose aim is to keep the Palestinian people detained under the occupation and the confiscation of its land and identity, and suppressing its freedom and undermining its rights. On the other hand, the policies and measures that come from the PNA are produced by a legal, national and elected authority. Therefore, there is no chance for comparison, equality, misinterpreting or mixing between these two subjects. How, then, if they are distinguished, and for whose interest?

For the interest of the occupation whose actions are described with underestimating words like “limited” in order not to provoke it, or is this word “limited” properly used when we talk about major issues like not giving the Palestinian share in the wave frequencies, or pressing for the closure of stations and so on.

 

Second: From the basic conditions regarding the effectiveness of any report, is not to have previously taken positions, and be objective, honest and precise. We are sorry to say that your report doesn’t follow these principles in some, or even many situations. It looks prejudiced against the Authority, critical to it, and overestimates its errors and mistakes.

The report isn’t concerned with mentioning the point of view of many of the security services and members who have been criticized, specially in questions that require hearing them, and displaying the different ideas and parties, following the most simple method in the professional journalistic honest work. For example, some of the measures taken by the Ministry of Information were mentioned in a completely inaccurate manner, or even, a false way, we may say.

The report mentioned, in page 17, that on 16^th and 17^th February 1998 that local TV stations were closed by the Ministry of Information because “they contradict the related laws and orders”, which implies that some unknown matters are behind the closure, when the truth was that the decision to close those stations relates basically to the attempt to organize the work of the audio-visual stations, and put an end to the chaos in the increasing unsystematic unprofessional situation, which harms the higher national interest of the security of the homeland.

In order to confirm that the reason behind the closure relates to lacking the professional requirements, we may say that six of those eight stations that were closed were reopened after they met the required criteria.

(Attached the decision of closure of the eight stations, and the decision of reopening six of them)

Another example for not being precise we find in the report regarding the al-Ru’aa TV station last May, where you presented the matter as if the PNA created an issue about the protest by the Christian sect, when the truth was, regardless of the legality and continuity of the closure until this time, that the station was closed after petitions were presented from a group of Christian brothers who considered the script play “Natreen Faraj” as disregarding Jesus Christ. A communiqué was also issued by the Patriarchate with the same meaning. You may ask for copies of these petitions and this communiqué, which means that the subject raised some reactions, and wasn’t created by the Authority, although we say that the play was taken more seriously than possible, and was misinterpreted as a message directed against occupation and settlements and didn’t mean to disrespect Jesus Christ in any way.

A third example, and the most influential, relates to the intensive activity in recording the violations and abuses committed by the PNA against press and journalists, with no similar activity to register or indicate the important achievements that were accomplished, starting with the press law in 1995, that guarantees the freedom of press and expression, the flowing and exchanging of information, and restricts the movement of the executive authority in solving disputes with the media, by appointing the judiciary and its courts and as the two parties to decide in disputes and abuses that occur or committed with or against any media party. Its only worth mentioning that this law prevented previous monitoring of any printed material, and allowed its publication and distribution without any monitor or observer. It allowed for easy measures regarding licensing newspapers and magazines, which allowed for 140 newspapers and magazines; daily, weekly, and seasonal, in this short period. It is also worth mentioning that all Arabic and foreign newspapers and magazines could be imported and distributed with no problems, even those that may contain criticism to the PNA or the PLO, because we believe in freedom of expression and political and thought pluralism. In this regard, we draw the attention of those who prepared the report to the fact that many newspapers and magazines, specially those produced by the opposition, contain wide and deep criticism, sometimes harmful, without being stopped by anyone. Moreover, the newsletters and magazines, issued by the human rights organizations are printed and distributed freely, in a manner not found in countries that pass a transitional phase like the one we live in, and don’t suffer exceptional circumstances like those we live.

Adopting the policy of establishing private radio and TV stations, with no hard conditions, without limiting it to the PNA supporters, reflects a democratic approach and a belief in variety and pluralism, not found in most of the 3^rd world countries and the Arab world. This deserves support and respect, equally if not more than when a private station is closed. It is not enough in this respect to present abuses and hints even in the issue of having many stations, and providing false information that transmission of a station covers only one neighbourhood within a city, when in some cases it reaches tens of kilometres.

In this place, we confirm that the Ministry of Information has no rejection against establishing a private TV or radio station in Gaza, and we have received several applications for this purpose, but they didn’t meet the professional and administrative requirements, and they were not pursued,

Having in mind that the transmission of some stations in the West Bank reaches Gaza.

Another example we find in the report, that it doesn’t indicate to any advantage of the PNA, even when it shows that abuses have decreased in the year 1998, and in the past part of 1999. Instead of taking that as an evidence on the improvement in the performance of the PNA, gained by learning from our experiences and mistakes, the resistance of the society and the change in the internal and external factors, the report refers that to what it calls “intensification” in self-censorship.

The springs of self-censorship are not restricted to the violations of the Authority or the influence of the advertising giants, but there are also the springs of traditions and costumes, social relations, family and tribal and sect relations, that make any criticism to an official a criticism to his family, village or camp or city or sect. There are also the extremist sides that use the cover of religion and hold the weapons in the face of any initiative even if it was by senior Islamic scientists. These people practice enormous censorship that leads to self-censorship not less than that caused by the political authority, if not more.

The important censorship, in addition, is practiced by the sponsors of the newspapers and magazines themselves, as we can’t ask or wait for the supporter of the Authority to make his newspaper follow the opposition or wait for the magazines of the opposition to support the Authority, this would be against the logic of things.

 

Third: In countries all over the world, those that are named democratic or the real democratic ones, there are subjects that are taboo, no one may discuss or talk about, because they may cause dispute or touch beliefs and thoughts of other, or harm the high national interest, or lead to racial or religious discrimination, urge for violence or disrespect divine religions, and others that became like holy matters that must be dealt with through judiciary, and not through any official in the executive authority, regardless of his high position, at the time of wars, emergencies, natural catastrophes and so on.

 

Fourth: The report falls into false accusation when it suggests that implementing the decree on incitement will necessarily lead to an increase in the suppression of Palestinian media. The case of the writer of the report is similar to that who told a lie then everybody believed it, he began to deal with it as a truth. The full truth is that about a year have passed since the establishment of the “suggested” committee for incitement, yet we didn’t see until now any interference or influence on the Palestinian media. Incitement genuinely springs out from the occupation and its actions and policies, and this committee has to focus on that. As for taking away the Palestinian memory and preventing freedoms and the change of syllabuses, all these are Israeli projects that shouldn’t be dealt with as official Palestinian policy that await the convenient chance to appear. The policy that urges for violence and racial discrimination and oppose peace is spread through out the extremist Israelis in a way that make fighting against what these extremists transmit a priority for the Palestinian side in the committee against incitement to focus upon. We also remind the writer of the report that we have the press law of 1995 to rely upon as a reference regarding the freedom of press and media, we don’t really know where from the report brought all this talk about suppression after issuing the decree on incitement?

 

Fifth: Based on what was mentioned earlier, we confirm that the PNA appreciates the important role of the various legal organizations, and that defending the Palestinian human rights, and those concerned with abuses committed against press and journalists, as they believe in the essential assistance to free the hands of the Palestinian media to enable it to take its basic role in the ballet to achieve national independence, development, and establishing democracy. Media is not only “her majesty – the fourth authority” but it is at present, at the time of the revolution of information, communications, satellites and internet, competing to take over the place of the first authority.

We in the Ministry of Information confess that there is a necessity to develop the role of the authority in the field of putting forward legislations and legal systems that guarantee the protection of all freedoms and on top the freedom of the press, and providing the suitable work atmosphere, and put our attention to fulfilling the most refined experiments of democracy on the basis that democracy is not only a silly dream but a way of life

Whose characteristics are dependent on the political, economical, and cultural development of the concerned country. Stages can’t be burnt hastily, nor we can go slackening, but as the French proverb says “Let’s

Hurry slowly” according to the need, capacity, and requirements of the real situation.

Finally: We bolster your efforts and hope that those comments would find their right response, and it is important to note that there are many issues in your report that require revision and reference to the related parties, such as the closure of “an-Nahar” and “al-Bilad” newspapers, for reasons related to the Authority and the allowed margin of freedom, when the truth was that they both stopped appearing due to financial reasons before anything else.

 

With much gratitude,

Hani al-Masri

Director General

Press and Publications

 

 

Comments on the Cartoons

 

 

1)         Israel                the PNA                       Journalists Association

 

2)         The Police                    A complaint

 

           

            They beat members of the Legislative Council…

            They “took care” of the journalists…

            They will certainly “look after” the normal citizen…

 

3)      A journalist accompanies an official to cover his activities!

 

4)      Chief Editor

 

Damn you…

A thousand times I said that journalism has nothing to do with

The problems of people…

It is adverts and commercials!

 

5)               Censorship                               the truth

 

 

 

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