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**BUSH'S FOREIGN POLICY &
NEO-CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11**

Participants:

Dr. William Kristol

Publisher and Editor of The Weekly Standard

Professor Peter Berkowitz

Professor of Law at George Mason University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University

Mr. Dov Weisglass

Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

Professor Itamar Rabinovich

President of Tel Aviv University

Professor Yossi Shain

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Program

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Professor Yossi Shain, Head of the Harold Hartog School of Government and Policy

Keynote Address:

Dr. William Kristol, Publisher and Editor of The Weekly Standard

Responses:

Professor Peter Berkowitz, Associate Professor of Law at George Mason University, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University

Mr. Dov Weisglass, Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

Professor Itamar Rabinovich, President of Tel Aviv University



A Note from the Head of the School

There has been much debate concerning the influence of prominent neo-conservatives on George W. Bush's Administration. Not only detractors of Israel and critics of "Jewish" power, but even mainstream American media has felt compelled in recent years to discuss neo-conservative ideology as synonymous with Jewish influence, even if they defensively conclude that the diversity of American Jewish voices makes such a "Jewish" perspective chimerical. Yet, the very fact that they make the issue problematic shows not only how deeply ingrained the fears of Jewish power are, but also inadvertently gives credence to those charges.

It is with this in mind that the Harold Hartog School of Government and Policy undertook to hold this event, in order to bring to the public agenda inquiry into the academic foundations and practical policy expressions of the neo-conservative movement. We feel that it is important and worthwhile to examine closely the charges brought against this movement, its alleged goals, and its self-proclaimed agenda, in the context of the Middle East. Clearly, since September 11, the Middle East has witnessed an unfolding of events and processes previously thought to be far fetched and the stuff of dreamers. From armed struggles to overturn dictators, to peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations and elections, we have been witness to U.S. influence across the board.

It is in light of this new era of American and international involvement in the Middle East, that the School decided to invite a prominent neo-conservative to our workshop series, which broadly focuses on democracy and democratization with a particular emphasis on patterns of American foreign policy over the last half century.

This booklet contains a transcript of a public discussion evening with **Dr. William Kristol**, publisher and editor of The Weekly Standard, **Professor Peter Berkowitz**, associate professor of Law at George Mason University, and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, **Mr. Dov Weisglass**, senior advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and **Professor Itamar Rabinovich**, President of Tel Aviv University and former Israeli ambassador to the United States (1993-1996).

The animated and enlightened debate that took place is testimony to the School's undertaking to sustain an environment for the discussion and analysis of pressing policy issues in both Israel and the rest of the world.

I would like to thank the Keshet Foundation, who brought our distinguished American guests to Israel. I would also like to give special thanks to the school's administrative staff, for their tireless and dedicated efforts in organizing the evening.



Professor Yossi Shain

Head of the Harold Hartog School of Government and Policy

Dr. William Kristol



"I don't want to say everything is going to be easy. We have a big challenge in figuring out how to make sure Hezbollah is contained and there are also many issues with Lebanon, Syria and Iran, but this is a very big moment. We are on the road towards a much better possible outcome in the Middle East."

Dr. William Kristol is editor of the influential Washington-based political magazine, *The Weekly Standard*. Widely recognized as one of America's leading political analysts and commentators, Dr. Kristol regularly appears on Fox News Sunday and on the Fox News Channel. Before founding *The Weekly Standard* in 1995, he led the Project for the Republican Future, where he helped shape the strategy that produced the 1994 Republican congressional victory. Prior to that, Dr. Kristol served as chief of staff to Vice-President Dan Quayle during the Bush administration and to Secretary of Education William Bennett under President Reagan. Before coming to Washington in 1985, he taught politics at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Kristol recently co-authored The New York Times bestseller: *The War Over Iraq – America's Mission and Saddam's Tyranny*.

Professor Peter Berkowitz



"Bush's decision to remove Saddam was bound up with the judgment that once Baghdad had been liberated, America could restore order and promote democracy. This is where Bush's Christian progressivism comes in. As a devout Christian, he believes in the universality of the human desire and capacity for freedom, beliefs which converge with the progressive impulse in neo-conservative foreign policy."

Professor Peter Berkowitz is an associate Professor of Law at George Mason University Law School. He is also a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a founding co-director of the Jerusalem Program on Constitutional Government, and serves as senior consultant to the President's Council on Bioethics. Professor Berkowitz taught government at Harvard University for nine years prior to his tenure at George Mason. His scholarship focuses on the interplay of law, ethics and politics in modern society. His current research projects are concerned with the relationship between classic and modern liberal principles and the role of individual virtue in democratic self-government. Professor Berkowitz is the author of two books: *Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism* (1999), *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (1995) for which he was awarded the Thomas J. Wilson Prize by Harvard University Press for the Best Book by a New Author. He has published numerous essays in *The New Republic*, where he is a contributing editor. In addition, Professor Berkowitz has written for a wide variety of other publications including *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Commentary*, *The London Review of Books*, *National Review*, *Policy Review*, *Public Interest*, *The Times Literary Supplement*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, *The Weekly Standard*, *The Wilson Quarterly*, and *The Yale Law Journal*.

Mr. Dov Weisglass



"It was clearly the events of September 11 that pushed the United States to speak for the first time, in a very clear voice, about the Middle Eastern conflict, or more precisely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

Dov Weisglass began his career in the Moritz-Margolis law firm, which 13 years later he bought and turned into one of the country's leading law firms. In 1980, he represented Yitzhak Rabin against the French magazine *L'Express*, and three years later, he represented Ariel Sharon against the Kahan Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra-Chatila massacre. In 1985-86 he represented Sharon again in his suit against *Time* magazine. He also specialized in representing security personnel who testified before commissions of inquiry (such as Yossi Ginossar, Shaul Mofaz, Hezi Callo, Alik Ron). Other clients include Ehud Yatom, Rafi Eitan, Shimon Sheves, Moshe Leon, Avigdor Lieberman, and Avigdor Kahalani. He also works with Israel's intelligence agencies and the kibbutz movement. He now works as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's senior adviser.

Profesor Itamar Rabinovich



"The Middle East is not a part of the world that lends itself to grand designs, to swift comprehensive solutions. This is not where you paint broad sweeps of the brush, this is where you paint very carefully, you work like a cobbler or like a mosaic builder: one piece at a time."

Professor Itamar Rabinovich is the President of Tel Aviv University. He is a Senior Research Fellow at TAU's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, and incumbent of the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East. Professor Rabinovich is the Andrew White Professor at Large at Cornell University. He was Israel's Chief Negotiator with Syria under the late Yitzhak Rabin, and Ambassador in Washington from 1993-96. He has served as Director of the Moshe Dayan Center, Dean of the Entin Faculty of Humanities, and TAU Rector. He is the author of several books including *Syria Under the Ba'th*; *The War for Lebanon*; *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations*; *The Brink of Peace: Israel and Syria*; and *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs at the End of the Century*, and has written numerous articles, essays and chapters in books as well as articles in leading professional journals.

Introduction by Professor Yossi Shain:

It is a pleasure and an honor to host you on behalf of the School of Government, the department of political science, and the Keshet Foundation, which was generous enough to sponsor the visit of Dr. Kristol and Prof. Berkowitz. Last year we were fortunate enough to have Prof. Fukuyama, and in this tradition of dealing with issues pertaining to theory and politics, we are fortunate enough to have with us tonight William Kristol from the United States, Dov Weisglass, senior advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Prof. Peter Berkowitz and our own president, Prof. Rabinovich.

I will now say a few words about our speakers and about tonight's discussion. September 11 and its aftermath opened up new debates on questions of morality, justice, legitimacy and values in international affairs. The debate over what constitutes operative actions and what does not, such as forces of 'good versus evil', or the values of 'enlightenment versus fundamentalism', brought morality back to the center stage of international politics. The delineation of camps is not always certain and its fluidity impacts international politics and moods in the corridors of power, especially within open societies. The war in Iraq heightened the mood swings and confused long-standing alliances of values and their prioritizations: democracy, human rights, self-determination, non-occupation, emancipation, equality, freedom, unilateralism vs. multilateralism, intervention, sovereignty and hegemony – all were debated. This development manifested itself with an upsurge of anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism in many parts of the globe, and anti-Europeanism in the United States.

With politics becoming imbued with idealism and not just real politic concerns, the language of justice and morality now permeates many areas of international and domestic politics. This calls into question the reorganization of the international community, with debates addressing the role of the United Nations, the utility of international courts, the future status of non-state actors and military alliances, and homeland security concerns versus civil rights issues.

The language of good and evil, right and wrong, just and unjust and the forum in which these issues can be decided – whether at the UN or other international organizations, or in the United States, as the last remaining super-power – is heavily contested on all levels of interaction. This was also impacted by ripple effect of a seemingly primordial civilizational struggle. It engulfed much of the world over a variety of issue areas, including Muslim migration in Europe, the continuing conflict in the Middle East, and the right to hold weapons of mass destruction.

Regardless of the initial sympathy expressed toward the United States in the days after September 11, soon thereafter, there was no agreement as to who was the villain in world affairs. This dramatic development reached a point where many began to reverse causality between

actors and events. To some, America itself was responsible for 9/11, Israel was responsible for suicide bombings and even Australia was responsible for the Bali bombing, and, of course, members of the Coalition of the Willing were responsible for the death of their hostages in Iraq. Even in the heart of Europe, the demonization of Bush and Sharon often surpassed that of Osama Bin-Laden; terrorists and suicide bombers were hailed as freedom fighters in the struggle of David versus Goliath, while top leaders of democratic states had to fear a confusion of legality and morality in European courts. Even today, European leaders continue to refuse to recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

In all these discussions, we have witnessed a very interesting debate over so-called neo-Conservatism. This ideology was ascribed, no less, to Jewish power in the United States. Indeed, this is not the first time that Jewish influence in the United States was alleged to have conquered American media, politics and society, and to have held hostage American foreign policy in the Middle East. Yet this time around, the vision is particularly widespread, and articulated almost with impunity by leading world politicians in Europe, including the former German defense minister and the French foreign minister, all of them deploring the pernicious impact of American Jewry, and especially the neo-conservative wing in the Bush administration.

This debate is, of course, part and parcel of the American debate, where charges of a neo-conservative push in Iraq were rampant, and where charges that neo-conservatives had hijacked the conservative vision of American politics were also leveled. Indeed, the subjects of neo-conservatism and American foreign policy became almost intertwined, and in this context we are delighted and honored to have William Kristol here tonight. He is regarded by many as a leading spokesperson for neo-conservative ideology, and a member of the Bush 'ideological team', so to speak.

Tonight, we would like to explore whether there is real congruence between Bush's policy and the neo-conservative view: What is this ideology? To what extent does it provide a guideline to American foreign policy? To what extent can we really deduce anything from this vision about the future, and how, in particular, does this vision impact Israel-US relations and Israel's role in the Middle East, which changes so rapidly?

Tonight we are privileged to host Dr. Kristol, one of the leading spokespersons for the neo-conservative movement, and Prof. Peter Berkowitz who is one of the leading authorities on conservative and liberal views of American foreign policy. We are also joined by Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon's senior adviser, and one of the leading lawyers in Israel; Prof. Rabinovich, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington as well as, of course, the head of the negotiating team between Israel and Syria who is very much familiar with American foreign policy and Israeli-American relations.

Dr. William Kristol:

Thank you Yossi. It is an honor to be here at Tel Aviv University and an honor to be with such distinguished fellow panelists. I should hasten to begin by saying that I do not speak for the Bush administration; please do not hold them responsible for anything I say. I am a defender of President Bush's foreign policy and occasionally a critic of some aspects of it, but although I am happy to be a defender of President Bush's foreign policy I do not speak on behalf of the administration. Needless to say, I am a private citizen, editor of a magazine. I should also say that I by no means speak for neo-conservatism as a movement, or for all neo-conservatives. Since many neo-conservatives, but not all, are Jews, you will understand what I mean when I say that if you put three neo-conservatives in a room, you will get four different opinions; so do not hold the others responsible for my argument.

Let me just quickly sketch out what I think is the current state of American foreign policy if you step back from the day-to-day headlines and examine what has happened in the last four years. The most important thing that has happened for us is, obviously, September 11, 2001, and I think it is a little hard perhaps here in Israel, where you have been used to terror, unfortunately for decades, to appreciate the shock of September 11 for us Americans. It was the end of an era, the 1990s, and for my generation it was the beginning of a third era of American foreign policy, beginning firstly with the Cold War era of the late 1940s up until 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell, or 1992 when the Soviet Union collapsed; and then the 1990s, an era of peace and prosperity, when some good things happened but problems which were not addressed have now come back to harm us. For you, perhaps the second era ended in September of 2000 and, similarly, there has perhaps been a new era in Israeli politics since then. However, for American politics, the significant day, the beginning of the new era was September 11. It was a big, big event.

I remember the afternoon of 9/11, talking to a friend who was a former cabinet secretary for Reagan and Bush. We were all in shock, of course; we were not sure how many thousands of people had been killed and we wanted to make sure our families and friends were alright. We then discussed the significance of the event but, of course, it was much too early, a few hours afterwards, to know the real significance. I said to him: 'Maybe this isn't really a big moment; maybe it's one of these terrible things that happens, but over time it fades, its impact fades and three years, five years, 10 years later, it is a tragedy but it does not really change politics or policy.' My friend said 'No – this is one of these unusual movements whose implications, whose impact, whose effects get bigger over time, not smaller'. He was right: five years from now, we will look back at 9/11 and have more of an appreciation of what a turning-point it was, what a big event it was for America.

I think my friend was right; and I think that the events of the last three and a half years have proven that. What was Bush's reaction to 9/11? Bush's reaction had many aspects, but for the purposes of this discussion, I will just focus on the Middle East which was the source, after all, of the terror that attacked us on 9/11. Bush's fundamental conclusion, which he came to pretty quickly, was that we not only had to go after the terrorist group that attacked us, but we also had to go after terrorist groups in general. We had to change or put pressure on regimes that hosted, harbored, sponsored or financed terrorist groups, and we had to worry a lot about the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, about terrorism and dictatorship, about terrorism and tyranny in the Middle East.

Fundamentally, President Bush concluded that the status quo in the Middle East was unacceptable. We could not deal with Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan and then go back to the way things were before. That did not mean that we could immediately turn everything around – we could not do that and no one responsible would – but it did mean thinking through a plan for starting to change the fundamental state of play in the Middle East. Bush decided that, for reasons both good and bad, we had made too many accommodations with dictators; we had turned a blind eye to Saudi Arabia's export of Wahabbi Islam; we had made deals with dictators who seemed to be pro-American for various reasons and who seemed to be keeping the peace with Israel in some cases, and for various reasons. The price we were paying was too great; too many of these dictators were in bed with terrorists; too many of these dictators were exporting terror and extremism as a way of keeping themselves safe at home. The reaction to these dictators was, in many cases, leading to greater anti-Americanism, greater extremism and greater terrorism. Bush decided fundamentally that this cycle had to be broken. As he said recently, this was a break from 60 years ago – six decades of US policy in the Middle East. This is a very big decision he made; he laid it out in various speeches and, more importantly perhaps, he carried it through in various actions and deeds.

So, once you decide the status quo has to be changed, what do you do? For Bush, there were two fundamental things that had to happen. First the US had to be strong. America had looked weak in the 1990s. We did not finish the war against Saddam or remove Saddam. I was in the government then and I thought it was a big mistake at the time and morally problematic too, to encourage the rebellion and then just leave them there. We did not remove Saddam, however, for various reasons having to do with UN authorization, and perhaps having to do with our belief that a weak Saddam would encourage stability in the region. In retrospect, however, it looked weak; you are a dictator, you invade your neighbor, you kill and slaughter lots of people; you get kicked out – and you are still in power. What kind of a lesson is that?

In the Balkans, Milosevic took that lesson right away – that you could get away with ethnic cleansing and murder, and we didn't do anything there in 1991 or 1992 either. In Somalia, we were kicked out by a small group of terrorists and thugs. In October 1993, we retreated after suffering 19 casualties. Then, of course, we did not intervene in Rwanda in 1994, and we did nothing about the terrorist takeover of Afghanistan in 1996. We threatened Saddam in 1998 but we did not move against him; we were threatened in Africa by Al-Qaeda in 1998, and the USS Cole was attacked in Yemen in October 2000. We carried out a few little air strikes after some of those attacks, but basically we did not look powerful. As Osama Bin-Laden said in one of his video-tapes, "The US is a weak horse, not a strong horse." He was wrong, thank God, and the US turned out to be a stronger horse than he expected and the American people turned out to be willing to pay the price of going after terror, of going into Afghanistan and going into Iraq.

Bush's first decision was that the US had to be strong. The mistake of the 1990s, with all the talk about US Wilsonianism, American empire, American overreaching and the mistakes after the end of the Cold War, was not that America was too strong, or intervened too much or too early, or that America imposed democracy all over the world. The mistake of the 1990s was that we did nothing in the Balkans, we did nothing in Rwanda, we were late in dealing with terror, and we did not remove Saddam. Bush decided we would be strong, and we would act more quickly and we would not continue to let it appear we were weak and unable to act.

Secondly, Bush decided we needed to change our strategy in the Middle East; we needed to be serious about promoting democracy, about insisting that regimes not tolerate terror. We all knew this to be a very complicated process which could not happen overnight, but we took heart from what happened in Asia, where people said Taiwan, Korea and the Philippines were not ready for democracy, and from what happened in Eastern Europe where people said Poland, Slovakia, Romania and countries like that were not ready for democracy; and Bush thought it was reasonable to begin pushing toward liberal democracy in the Middle East: if not now – when? That does not mean that Bush is a Wilsonian who thinks he can snap his fingers and transform the whole region and ignore its culture and history. But what was the alternative – to bet on the next generation of Mubaraks, or the next generation of Assads and prop up these dictators who were increasingly weak and increasingly erratic, and whose countries were increasingly becoming hotbeds of anti-Americanism and extremism, either because the dictators fostered it or because, by reacting to the dictators, popular movements became anti-American because America looked as though it was propping up dictators?

Were we going to continue to ignore the house of Saud's export of Wahabbi Islam which was transforming the Middle East? Were we going to ignore Iran's nuclear program? Bush decided we had to be serious about changing the Middle East. He has explained this in many speeches.

More importantly, he has taken actions: he went into Afghanistan – that was obviously the key first step; Bush’s speech of June 24, 2002 was a key step. It is under-appreciated in the US.

The isolation of Arafat and the fundamental change in US policy toward the Palestinians in the sense that we were open to a Palestinian state but not if it was a terrorist state - yes to a Palestinian state and no to a terrorist state – this was one of Bush’s fundamental decisions which I think is now vindicated. I think it was a necessary change which Bush really took alone with Sharon, and against almost every other country in the world. He suffered a lot of criticism from Europe for his refusal to meet Arafat and legitimize him, but I think it was very clearly the right thing to do.

As for the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam: we made mistakes – certainly. After removing Saddam, I don’t think we had enough troops, we were not well prepared for the insurgency and the terror afterwards, but, to the President’s credit, he stayed the course. I was in Europe in November 2003 when Bush announced we were going to turn over power to the Iraqi government because we realized that we needed the Iraqis to take charge. We had let the occupation, if you want to call it that, drag out too long. So, Bush announced we were going to speed up the turnover. Everyone in Europe, every sophisticated foreign policy analyst, all of Dubya’s friends in the European capitals and in government, understood what this meant: this meant we were getting out. Turning over authority was a fig leaf, an excuse to withdraw.

If one person said this to me, 20 people said this to me. Karl Rove (Bush’s senior adviser) will not let the president go to re-election with 125,000 troops, as it was then, in Iraq taking casualties. We are going to withdraw; we will get half of them out before the election and Bush will go to the American people saying “I am getting out of Iraq”.

I have been critical of Bush in all kinds of ways, both tactical and operational. I think the first term suffered from a State Department that did not really believe in Bush’s foreign policy, and a defense department that did not really believe in parts of Bush’s foreign policy, but nonetheless, Bush deserves huge credit for staying the course in Iraq. Bush went to the American people with 155,000 troops in Iraq, taking casualties, no easy promises of getting out soon, no demagogic promises that it would be easy, that there would be no problem and we would be out in six months or a year. When Clinton went into Bosnia in 1995, which I supported, he promised we would have the troops out within a year. He knew it wasn’t true. He thought: ‘Let me get through the election and then I’ll say: circumstances have changed, we will have to stay a few more years. I was right to stay and we did a good job in Bosnia, we saved a lot of lives by staying there and we now have just a few thousand troops’. Bush did not take the easy way, he did not pull out and he deserves huge credit for staying the course in Iraq. Incidentally, because we stayed the course in Afghanistan – we increased our troops

in 2003 and 2004 and got NATO involved – because of that there were successful elections in Afghanistan on October 7, 2004 and that was followed, by the democratic uprising in Ukraine which was also partly a product of Bush and the West pushing, not allowing an election to be stolen.

There was of course the Palestinian election, which went better than expected in January 2005: people had said for years: you can't hold this election under Israeli occupation – with all these terrorist groups there, there will be slaughter, chaos, violence - and yet it went off smoothly. Then, of course, there was the election in Iraq on January 30, 2005.

When historians write up this period, the date that will stand out is January 30, 2005, when eight million Iraqis went to the polls, despite the terrible threat of murder, terror, bombs going off and attempted intimidation, to say they wanted to govern themselves. So now we have a complicated messy political process in Iraq, but it is normal – you all know a lot about complicated and messy political processes. I think the Iraqi government is still going to be less confusing than the Israeli government from a distance, and probably more united. It is an amazing thing happening in Iraq; there are still problems but obviously January 30 was a huge day and its implications are now being felt throughout the Arab world.

Elections in Iraq, popular demonstrations in Lebanon, a promise from Mubarak to move towards elections; even in Saudi Arabia there has been some movement towards empowering people which I think has been a fundamental change. Things could still go wrong in all in kinds of ways; we should not be complacent. I give Bush and Condoleezza Rice a lot of credit for not sitting back and assuming everything is going to happen automatically. The State Department under Condoleezza Rice, unlike the State Department in Bush's first term, is now deeply engaged in diplomatic pressure, working with our allies, working with other nations, really trying to make things happen without the use of force in some of these countries, and it does show that the United States can be quite effective when you have a State Department that is energetically pursuing the president's foreign policy.

In any case, the implications of the demonstrations in Lebanon are very great; it has been a long time since there were any demonstrations in the Arab world that were not directed against the United States, Israel or against Jews, and that were directed for democracy and freedom and against an Arab occupier of their country. That is a very big deal.

From the US point of view, there have been two memorable photographs of popular demonstrations in the Arab world in the last four years: one on September 12 of the Palestinian celebrations in Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah over the destruction of the World Trade Center; but also, the peaceful demonstrations for freedom and democracy. Again, I don't want to say

everything is going to be easy. We have a big challenge in figuring out how to make sure Hezbollah is contained and there are also many issues with Lebanon, Syria and Iran, but it is a very big moment. I think we are on the road towards a much better possible outcome in the Middle East.

Neo-conservatism at its best, when it started in the 1960s and 1970s, involved fresh thinking in light of new events in the late 1960s, in foreign and domestic policy. The current version is very much a similar movement in the sense that new thinking is necessary, certainly for us in the US and, frankly, for you in Israel. This is not the Cold War and this is not the 1990s. It is a new moment. One can tell it is a new moment by all of the fluidity and unpredictability of what happens: look at the political alignments. In this country, they have changed amazingly in just three, four or five years. People who were on the left have moved to the center-right; and people who were on the right – some who even used to be heroes of the right, have also shifted, and the old dream of both the right and the left seems to be gone – it is a very new moment. In the United States, too, Bush sounds more, in some ways, like a Liberal Democrat who believes in human rights and democracy, than like a traditional Conservative isolationist or realist who has a very un-ambitious role for the United States.

In a similar way, you have a mixing up of the old political categories. What is needed is new and fresh thinking and in that respect, both of our countries can help each other come to grips with this new moment. If you want an analogy for this moment, I think it is not unlike the early years of the Cold War – the late 1940s after World War II when at first people thought we would go back to the way it was before. Truman, like Bush, did not expect to have to deal with all these foreign policy challenges; he expected to be a domestic policy president, as Bush did. But they were confronted with new challenges; they rose to them, they were surprised, they made some mistakes but still, fundamentally, they rose to the challenge of the time.

That is very true here in Israel at the time of the founding of the state, when all kinds of opportunities and challenges manifested themselves and very difficult decisions had to be taken, and old presumptions abandoned. We now look back on Ben-Gurion and on Truman, as statesmen who rose to the moment and seized the opportunity and I think it is possible that here, in 2005, we have a similar moment when there is a new political era and when we hope our political leadership rises to the occasion in helping to create a more free and peaceful world. Thank you.

Prof. Peter Berkowitz:

I want to begin where Bill Kristol stopped, with some of the paradoxes of the political moment in the United States. Whereas he said he wanted to take a step back from the burning issues of the day, I want to take another step back and discuss some of these overarching paradoxes.

Let me begin with President Bush who is, indeed, a president of paradoxes. In 2000, he ran as a “uniter” not as a divider, but his re-election produced one of the most bitterly-fought campaigns in memory. During his first campaign, he made his appeal as a compassionate conservative with the focus on domestic affairs and a modest foreign policy. Yet he became a wartime president; friend and foe alike agree that he has undertaken an extraordinarily bold program to combat terror and re-shape the Middle East. Perhaps, most astonishingly, Bush is a genuinely conservative president who articulated and acted upon what it is fair to call a boldly progressive foreign policy. So how is all of this connected to neo-conservative ideas?

Let me explain: to understand the paradoxes of George. W. Bush, it is necessary to recall a few simple facts about politics in America. Most conservatives in America, as well as most progressives, are liberal in a broad sense and are democrats in a broad sense. Right and left in America share certain bedrock principles: individuals have rights that no government should infringe upon; a legitimate government is grounded in the sovereignty of the people. Right and left in America differ over priorities – political priorities. Take conservatives: generally speaking, they maintain a lively sense of the weaknesses of human nature, the excesses and the unreliability. They cherish custom and tradition, they put a premium on preserving individual freedom and equality before the war that has already been won, and they want to do this by limiting the reach of government. Progressives, or the left, maintain a lively sense of the possibilities of human nature, the creativity, the perfectibility. They celebrate innovation in private life and seek improvement of society by government and they focus on expanding individual freedom and enlarging the scale of equality, typically by increasing government size and role. Given these priorities, you can see how President Bush’s policy of promoting democracy in Iraq and throughout the Arab Middle East actually has something in common with the progressive point of view.

Under Bush, the United States accomplished the surgical removal of a totalitarian dictator half-way around the globe at a cost in excess of 100 billion dollars. The United States has sought to implant democratic institutions on foreign soil that have never known self-government. This is a pretty large-scale government project; it is aimed at building a more open and inclusive society and represents the single greatest feat of social engineering America has ever undertaken.

Yet, despite the progressive features of the Bush policy in Iraq, progressives in America have been bitterly opposed to the war; they have predicted nothing but disaster and strangely, they have fortified their criticisms of the Bush administration with typically conservative arguments or observations. Progressive critics point out that the government's competence is severely limited; its main job in Iraq should have been, they say, to have maintained the status quo, not to improve the situation. So, how did it happen that a conservative president staked his presidency on a foreign policy rich with progressive implications, and how did it happen that he was roundly condemned by progressives for doing so? It is a long story.

Let's start with the progressive critics: they had some respectable arguments against the Iraq war and the United States' efforts to build democracy there. They emphasized that democracy depends on culture and morals; they stressed that the United States lacked the know-how to democratize a large, far-away country. After all, we don't speak the language, we don't understand their traditions which differ dramatically from our own, and let's be realistic – Iraqi politics is rife with ethnic and religious sectarianism. These are all respectable arguments, and, I must add, until the day-before-yesterday, they were thought to be conservative arguments. How did progressive critics come to these conservative conclusions? I think it is partly because they were caught so unaware by the expression of this progressive impulse after 9/11, in both American neo-conservatism and in President Bush's foreign policy. So a word about that neo-conservatism.

Neo-conservatism in America has had both a domestic agenda and a foreign policy agenda. The domestic agenda has focused for several decades on criticizing the excesses of the welfare state. The foreign policy agenda for several decades has stressed the promotion of democracy abroad, both as a strategic interest, a vital national interest and as a moral imperative: the right thing to do. This is critical – this distinguishes neo-conservatism and both other forms of conservatism from the progressivism in America. Neo-conservatives have been confident over the decades in the American military and have believed that the promotion of democracy, a very good thing, depends critically, in part, on America's capacity to project power around the globe. To be sure, neo-conservative faith in American military power as a force for good in the world has always been intentioned with the characteristic neo-conservative skepticism about government programs at home, and neo-conservatism for foreign adventures puts American neo-conservatives at odds with more traditional conservatives in America. They wish to reserve the United States armed forces for direct and immediate military threats.

At the same time, neo-conservatives over the decades have exhibited a strong distrust of the United Nations and of international institutions more generally. This was more consistent with their critique of big government: while they did not oppose diplomacy or multilateralism, their doubts about it, about its efficacy, distinguished their outlook from the heirs in the United

States of Woodrow Wilson, whom we call the liberal internationalists of today's Democratic Party. To sum up neo-conservative foreign policy, you might describe it as often pursuing progressive ends, the universal spread of liberal democracy by non-progressive means: the American armed forces.

In fact, neo-conservative voices were not prominent in the first Bush campaign. In the fall of 2000, candidate Bush was thoroughly believable in his debates with candidate Gore when he declared his opposition to a foreign policy based on nation-building. He was firm and unequivocal. This reflected classical conservative realism, and nothing in the first seven and a half months of Bush's presidency gave the slightest indication that he was inclined to adopt a more ambitious approach. If it had not been for the September 11 attacks, Bush's latent progressive impulse might have never come to the fore.

The assault on the United States, however, changed the equation: Bush concluded it was now too dangerous not to confront tyrannies that bred and nurtured terror, tyrannies that traffic in weapons of mass destruction. Of course, this conclusion did not oblige Bush to go to war with every dictator on the face of the earth. It obliged him to establish priorities and determine the most effective means for dealing with each particular threat. A reasonable person does not go to war if he believes it will leave the situation worse than he found it. In fact, Bush's decision to remove Saddam was bound up with the judgment that once Baghdad had been liberated, which was not really in doubt, America could restore order and promote democracy in Iraq – which is still open to question.

This is where Bush's deep-seated progressivism, what I would call Christian progressivism, comes in. As a devout Christian, he believes deeply in the universality of the human desire for freedom and the human capacity for freedom, and these beliefs converge with the progressive impulse in neo-conservative foreign policy. Time and again in his major speeches about Iraq, Bush has repeated some variant on this crucial idea that freedom is not America's gift to the world but God's gift to humanity or – as he sometimes says – all human hearts yearn for freedom. He likes to put it in theological language, but this belief, this conviction reflects the liberal and progressive idea that all men and women are endowed with certain inalienable rights. But let's be clear: it does not follow from this belief, or Bush's belief, that it is America's job to fan out into the world and compel nations around the globe to undertake the challenges of self-government. What does follow?

Well, when security considerations counsel regime change in a rogue state, the United States can have a reasonable prospect of leaving the country it has invaded a better place than it found it. Why is that? Because, and this is both the Bush answer and the neo-conservative answer: because democracy is the form of government to which all people, given the choice,

will incline; and, if given the opportunity – and this is a big ‘if’ – the resources, the security, the education, it is the form of government they will seize. So while the January 30 elections were extremely heartening, the outcome for Iraq, it must be said, still remains to be seen.

To judge Bush fairly, one has to pay adequate attention to what he says about what you might call his liberty doctrine. Even at home, maybe especially at home, critics of Bush do not always do this. The President’s second inaugural address, delivered in the United States in early June, is a case in point: it nicely laid out the Bush doctrine but you can’t recognize the Bush doctrine based upon what critics say about it. On one hand, Bush is typically accused of being too idealistic; critics, for example, complain of his “uncompromising language” as inappropriate for an incumbent president. They charge that, if taken at face value, Bush’s words would imply nearly limitless obligations to confront all manner of autocrats around the planet, even in cases in which anti-democratic governments in the Middle East and elsewhere support United States interests. On the other hand, the critics contend the problem is not that Bush is too much of an idealist but that he is the opposite: a cynical realist. They say the President is not really committed to an expensive campaign on behalf of democracy but rather, that Bush constantly uses very vague terms so that he can avoid any actual commitments to actual regimes.

In fact, the Bush doctrine combines idealism and realism and it seeks to balance them, which, admittedly, is quite difficult. For example, Bush declared in his January speech, that the great objective of ending tyranny is the concentrated work of generations. The use of the word ‘tyranny’ is idealistic. Understanding that it is the concentrated work of generations – that is realistic. He also affirmed the need to respect the diversity of nations, so he explained that “when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own”. He also brought out the continuity of his policy by linking the determination to expand freedom in the world to “the durable wisdom of our constitution”, to “our deep commitments” and to “the day of fire”, which compels one to rethink the relationship between our vital interests and our deepest beliefs.

Moreover, a blend of idealism and realism can be seen in the principles he invokes, and the kind of role he sees for the United States in honoring them. In his inaugural address, he idealistically invoked these principles. He said, “From the day of our founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights and dignity and matchless value because they bear the image of the Maker of heaven and earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave.” At the same time, he realistically explained that since freedom, by its nature, must be chosen and defended by its citizens and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities, the limited goal of the United States must always be to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom and make their own way.

Indeed the President made clear that in a post-9/11 world, the strategic imperative and the moral imperative converge; the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. Furthermore, his second inaugural address contradicts the notion of Bush as a kind of naïve cowboy obliged to immediately confront all autocrats everywhere, whether friend or foe. While he expressed an unyielding conviction in the goodness of the goal of human freedom, he also acknowledged the need for flexibility in pursuing it. It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world. Seek and support, he said, not coerce, not compel. Indeed, as he said, promoting freedom is not primarily the task of arms; it is largely a task of education and a task of diplomacy.

To be sure, Bush's doctrine of liberty raises plenty of questions. Here are a few: how will the reconstruction of Iraq play out and affect our efforts to defend freedom? You might think after the past few weeks, that somehow the invasion, the emancipation, has unleashed a wave of democratization that is sweeping the Middle East. Or rather – is it, as some critics have said, that the United States action has provoked a profound instability? Are we equipped and willing to apply all kinds of concrete pressures on hostile regimes such as Iran and North Korea and the rising giant China? What about autocratic allies such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt? In the end, is the President's "evangelical liberalism" a departure from American liberalism, a departure from American traditions, or has it fallen to Bush to make explicit, and defend this tendency within our liberalism? These are critical matters and they are not just for conservatives or for neo-conservatives.

Certainly, cooperating in the development of ideas for the task of spreading liberty abroad should be of interest to liberals and progressives, for they too place a priority on the universal claims of individual freedom and equality under the law.

Thank you.

Mr. Dov Weisglass:

While my learned friends have laid out so interestingly the broader context of Bush's ideology or philosophy, I would like to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian track in which I have had some experience.

We remember sadly how the second Intifada started in September 2000. The United States generally paid very little attention to what was happening on the ground from the start of the Intifada until May 2001. US involvement was mainly a combination of condemnation of the terrible terrorist incidents that took place, and criticism about whether we were over-reacting to those incidents. It was clearly the events of September 11 that pushed the United States to speak for the first time, in a very clear voice, about the Middle Eastern conflict, or more precisely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Bush did just that in his famous address of June 24, 2002, which revolutionized the way that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to be more precise, the role of terrorism in that conflict, was portrayed.

For many years, we as victims of terrorism, were caught in a kind of vicious circle where we were told that the Palestinians' total lack of political rights was the cause of terrorism. We were told that the existence of terrorism was because there was no political progress in the conflict between us and the Palestinians. The fact is, terrorism was perceived in other parts of the world with a kind of a relative prohibition, and we heard all kinds of nuances indicating semi-justified terrorism, terrorism that was understood and forgiven, and terrorism that was necessary.

The clearest headline announced by President Bush in his June 24 address was a complete and total negation of terrorism as any sort of recognized 'ingredient' or tool in any political conflict. It was the first time the United States had decreed a total prohibition of the use of violence as an element in any political process, and that, of course, immediately had an effect on the peace management plan outlined in Bush's speech. The President's June 24 speech, which was later endorsed in a more detailed plan known as the roadmap, suggested a plan of how to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the stage it was at then – a very bloody and acute conflict – up to the final stage of two states living side-by-side in peace and security: Israel and Palestine.

The roadmap has to be accomplished in phases, meaning there will be no progress or no advancement from one phase to the next unless the first phase has been fully, completely and perfectly implemented. That is why the roadmap is entitled: "A performance-based peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict". The first phase involves a complete cessation of terrorism, a complete and total dismantling of terrorist organizations; a complete cessation of any form of incitement; a build-up of new governance institutions in the Palestinian Authority;

a reinstatement of rural law; the re-instatement of a functioning judicial system, a budget system, a government system and a parliamentary system.

Of course, from our perspective however, the main pre-condition for any political process was this very strong and clear demand for a complete and total dismantling of terrorist organizations. By the way, the requirement for the Palestinians to dismantle terrorist organizations was not just a mere statement or slogan; it was a clear reference to two very detailed work plans laid out by two distinguished American visitors: George Tenet, at the time chief of the CIA, and later by General Anthony Zinni. Both worked with Israelis and Palestinians on a plan for dismantling terrorist organizations, which lays out in minute detail exactly how to do this. That is to say, it prescribes how to take away unlawful arms from people, what statutes and other pieces of legislation are required to outlaw any organization, and how to define involvement in or affiliation with terrorist activities. The President made very clear that the Palestinians are expected to fully implement those two very well-detailed plans so that terrorism will disappear unconditionally without any corresponding or reciprocal giving by the State of Israel.

These, of course, were the revolutionary aspects of his speech, because, as I said before, we were always told terrorism would somehow disappear once the Palestinians are politically satisfied. It has always been assumed throughout history that once people use terrorism as a way to satisfy certain political claims, if those claims are satisfied, then terrorism will gradually fade away. Therefore there was this very clear, ongoing demand and mutual need to move politically forward, with the expectation that terrorism would disappear, almost symmetrically, with the volume of political momentum achieved. The State of Israel has affirmed over the years that it would never negotiate under fire, so the assumption that terrorism would somehow disappear if political progress were made, was just too risky to act on. Any Palestinian state that is founded would have all the prerogatives, privileges, powers and authority of an independent state, and would enjoy all the immunities granted by international law which would mean our ability to maintain security like we do now, would be reduced to zero. The way the Israel Defense Forces go in and out of Palestinian-controlled areas when the need arises, whether to carry out arrests or take any other preemptive action, will either be stopped or significantly curtailed because it will become a relationship between two sovereign states.

That is why Israel has always explained that the expectation, which is based on historically-accumulated world experience, that terrorism will somehow disappear if the political claims of the Palestinians are satisfied, is a risk we are not willing to take. That, basically, was the core of the deadlock.

So this was the first time the world's major political power, led by George W. Bush, acknowledged that risk. He said that the way to break this cycle was very clear. Firstly, terrorism must be eliminated, and then secondly, there will be political progress. There is no link, or parallel aspirations between the two. Specifically, the right sequence of progress is that terrorism is eliminated and then there will be political progress.

The other parts of his speech, which relate to those pre-requisites imposed on the Palestinians before any political progress could take place, clearly relates to those values that my learned friend has mentioned; but also in a very clear terrorism-prevention related context. Once terrorism is eliminated, there needs to be an understanding that maintaining this state of security requires serious law-enforcement agencies rather than the 18 independent security organizations which exist at present in the Palestinian Authority; there needs to be a clear channel of command, a clear legal system and set of rules which aim at fighting terrorism, which is only just beginning to be established. And there needs to be effective government.

This speech was the first time the American administration had claimed publicly that the regime led by Chairman Arafat was the major obstacle to both progress and to the hope that the goals laid down in these phases would ever be accomplished. For the first time, President Bush spoke about the need for a new and different leadership to emerge for the Palestinians. By using the phrase, "a new Palestinian leadership", Arafat was ruled out of the American political plan, and slowly, he was ruled out by the rest of the world. The demand for the Palestinians to form a government led by a prime minister, something that had never existed before in Palestinian political life, was an immediate outcome of that need to create a certain political barrier between the Chairman and the Palestinian executive.

Later on the speech was endorsed, and work began on this political plan. Ultimately it was halted, mainly due to Arafat's obstruction. We are now, however, at the beginning of a new attempt to reactivate the process. So far, this conflict is 104 years old, so it may take some time and a few hardships to get it going, but it has gained momentum once more and we hope that in the very near future, we will see some results on the ground.

Thank you.



Dr. William Kristol delivers his address.



Professor Peter Berkowitz delivers his address.



Dr. Kristol and Mr. Weisglass share a moment before the event.



A full house for the discussion evening.

Prof. Itamar Rabinovich:

I will try and build a bridge between the two overviews presented by the visitors from Washington, and the more specific concrete analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian track by Dov Weisglass, who has played such an important role in putting together strategy in dealing with this important issue.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is indeed a very good point of connection between the overall principles of the Bush foreign policy, their reception internationally, and the concrete reality in the Middle East. On the eve of the election of the re-election of President Bush, which, I would say, was a low point for United States policy in the Middle East, this has become the lightning rod: United States policy in Iraq was seen to be in the throes of a crisis. Brilliant military success was followed by political debacle, casualties, no clear way out, a lingering Israeli-Palestinian crisis, a looming Iranian crisis and a very poor state of relations between the United States and Europe, very much focused on the debate on Middle Eastern policy.

Somehow, in a very uncomfortable fashion, many of the grievances seemed to focus on the American-Israeli alliance or partnership, on American-Israeli cooperation on the Palestinian issue; and both the United States and Israel – President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon personally – were vilified over the issue.

This all changed dramatically for the better in the aftermath of the re-election for a number of reasons. First of all, let us look at the matter of re-election. It is one thing to relate to a president who may not be re-elected, and another to know that the President has just been re-elected and will be there for another four years and is thus fortified in his position. This is the President of the United States that you have to deal with for the next four years in his second term.

Secondly, in Iraq, as has been previously mentioned, the situation has improved. It is not just an election issue – there are fewer American casualties, there was a very successful election and, overall, a sense that things have taken a turn for the better in Iraq. On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the death of Arafat opened a new window and improved the situation dramatically creating an opportunity to move ahead, with an Israeli Prime Minister from the right who made a decision of his own free will to withdraw from Gaza. This, from the point of international diplomacy, provides Sharon with a lot of political capital, first and foremost for his partner in Washington, but also for many others.

More recently we can see the Syrian crisis, which has weakened or exposed the weakness of an important regime, considered as radical and one of Iran's main allies in the region. It is also Hezbollah's patron, and the patron of rejectionist Palestinian organizations. If you add all this

up, it appears that there has been a very significant turn for the better in the position of United States' policy in the region.

Here I would like to give a word of caution: we have heard talk about a new moment in the Middle East, a new opportunity – but for what? For democratization, a new regional order? For reform or peace-making? My note of caution is that the Middle East is not ripe for that – there is no Berlin Wall in the Middle East. In Europe in the late 1980s, there was the symbolic collapse of the Berlin Wall followed by massive and very positive, stabilizing changes. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe was transformed by the configuration of circumstances and this became a durable change in Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, by and large, more democratic, stable and open regimes were created and were able to endure, and crises which have erupted since, such as the Ukrainian crisis, have been overcome.

This, I'm afraid, is not the state of affairs in the Middle East. Look at a country like Iraq. Bill Kristol referred to the criticism of neo-conservative ideology at work in Iraq, but it is an uphill battle because Iraq is not even put together as a state. There is no state, there is no political community, there is no civil society. A democratic Iraq, or even a stable, unified Iraq is a long way away. Syria – yes, Syria is weak and it may be evicted from Lebanon, and possibly the pressure on the regime could topple it altogether, but what is the alternative? Is Lebanon ripe for a return to pre-1975 consociational democracy, or are we going to see the Shiite community using the occasion to press for its share of power under the guise of democracy? What is the prospect of a Shi'a plurality, or even majority in Iraq, and a Shi'a plurality in Lebanon under a democratic guise? What is the alternative to the Assad-Baath regime in Syria? What is the most potent political force in Syria?

The Israeli-Palestinian track, which is, of course, on much firmer ground than it was, also has its pitfalls ahead. So my note of caution and my advice would be that this part of the world does not lend itself to grand designs, to swift comprehensive solutions. This is not where you paint broad sweeps of the brush. This is where you paint very carefully. You work like a cobbler or like a mosaic builder - one piece at a time. If this is heeded, and if the work continues in the right direction – one piece at a time – we may see the positive trend continue and be reinforced.

Dr. William Kristol:

I wish to make two additional points about the excellent presentations we have just heard, and with which I have little disagreement. Regarding Itamar's most recent point, there is an ongoing debate, but I would simply say this: it is too late to create mosaics, it is too late to paint carefully; the genie has been unleashed, which is a good thing in my view. We are going to go through a very turbulent time and the idea that we can slow it down or would want to slow it down I believe to be frankly impossible and inconceivable.

We are not going to stand with the democrats in Lebanon when they demonstrate on the streets, and we are not going to insist that Assad leave Syria. Itamar might say, that's okay, but be careful what you wish for in Syria, and of course in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. That is obviously fair enough; but it was true in 1989 too: Hungary was ready for freedom; Poland was ready for freedom; they had civil societies. Bulgaria and Romania were not ready for freedom, everyone said at the time. All the experts said it was simple-minded to assume that all these countries were like each other, but when you get to certain moments in history, things start to happen and one has to ride the horse or ride the tiger and try to shape it and control it.

I do agree with Itamar that it would be irresponsible to simply unleash everything and then to step back. Let us look at Eastern Europe: what did we do? We pushed for German unification, which was the maximal strategy, contrary to the wishes of many Europeans; and then we pushed for the integration of the eastern European nations into NATO. The Europeans, to their credit, integrated them into the European Union. Indeed, we had to fight a war against Milosevic in the Balkans. It was not a smooth ride but once it had begun, we had to try to shape it and ride it rather than hope we could slow it down and do it one piece at a time.

So I have a somewhat different view; we will see who is right. Maybe I am exaggerating this momentum but I think that there has been a forced stability in this region for too long; there is no other region in the world where if you left in 1983 and came back in 2003, the same people would still be in power – Mubarak, Assad, the house of Saud, and the Syrians are still in Lebanon. In a certain way it this stability was a mixed blessing, but in other ways it is not a blessing. However, I believe this period is over and the one thing we know about history is that these transformations are going to happen unpredictably and in some cases dangerously.

I think the issue, however, is focusing on shaping these precarious changes, not resisting them. I am not sure that Itamar and I would fundamentally disagree in practice, I would just be more optimistic. I am inclined to think that the way to engage is to shape these changes, to think about what we have to do to make sure Hezbollah does not gain ground or gain control in Lebanon. However, we must not hesitate to pressure Syria to leave because of the possibility

that Hezbollah may gain control.

A second point which I want to make is that I do believe that because we are all professors or former professors, we tend to exaggerate the importance of ideology. At the end of the day the speeches are important. They are important and ideas are important, especially the speeches of the President of the United States, but only when they are backed up by deeds. The June 24th speech for example was important, but that speech would have meant nothing without the actions of the Israeli government in April of 2002. Deeds matter most; talking about democracy in the Middle East would not have mattered if we had not shown the ability to stay in Iraq and to take casualties and to help the Iraqis achieve at least one successful election, and I think there will be more.

So I think that we should avoid talking about the doctrines and about the ideologies, and realize that the key is actions. Diplomacy, someone wrote recently, is about processes and speeches; foreign policy is about results. It does have to be judged by results. One can achieve results through speeches and diplomacy – as you can see in Lebanon. Think of examples of what pressure can achieve. In the Ukraine it had a real effect, also in Lebanon with the Kafiahs – the Arab word for “enough” which is the slogan in Egypt and Lebanon, and which was also the slogan in Georgia and the Ukraine.

I feel we have all slightly exaggerated the importance of the “Bush Doctrine” and the neo-conservative ideology. We have also under-estimated the importance of some leaders who have had to take some very tough decisions, particularly Sharon in March-April 2002, Bush in terms of going into and staying in Iraq. There will also be tough decisions to make in the future, and that is really where the promise of the speeches has to be vindicated by the actions of democratic leaders.